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Abstract
This article1 proposes a complete framework for handling the dy-
namics of an abstract argumentation system. This frame can encom-
pass several belief bases under the form of several argumentation sys-
tems, more precisely it is possible to express and study how an agent
who has her own argumentation system can interact on a target argu-
mentation system (that may represent a state of knowledge at a given
stage of a debate). The two argumentation systems are defined inside a
reference argumentation system called the universe which constitutes a
kind of “common language”. This paper establishes three main results.
First, we show that change in argumentation in such a framework can
be seen as a particular case of belief update. Second, we have intro-
duced a new logical language called YALLA in which the structure of
an argumentation system can be encoded, enabling to express all the
basic notions of argumentation theory (defense, conflict-freeness, ex-
tensions) by formulae of YALLA. Third, due to previous works about
dynamics in argumentation we have been in position to provide a set
of new properties that are specific for argumentation update.
1This report has been submitted as a research article to the International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning. It has been accepted with minor revisions in March 2016.
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1 Introduction
Argumentation is commonly used in everyday life where we share and con-
front our opinions. We use arguments to sustain an idea, we use counter-
arguments in order to attack another idea. Argumentation can be viewed
as a process done in order to exchange information together with some jus-
tification with the aim to obtain well-justified knowledge, or with the aim
to increase or decrease the approval of a point of view, or to confront and
combine different views. When several people are sharing arguments the ar-
gumentation is pervaded by changes. Those changes may concern the public
state of a debate or the agent’s representation of the world. Each time an
argument is uttered, the listener might change her view of the world. This is
why it is important to analyze the link between argumentation and change.
Let us notice that argumentation does not necessarily require an audience,
since it can be done by only one agent (and in that case it is well adapted
for reasoning and decision making).
In artificial intelligence, argumentation has been defined for formalizing
argumentative reasoning and in order to automatize some forms of dialog
(identified in [55]). As done in many other approaches we place ourselves in
the framework of abstract argumentation theory (where arguments are not
precisely defined; see [31]) which handles argumentation systems that are
graphs whose vertices are arguments and edges are attacks between those
arguments. More generally, argumentation theory aims at computing the
acceptability of arguments [31, 11, 3]. A natural development of this theory
is called enforcement [8] and consists in finding a set of arguments to add
to an argumentation system in order to make accepted a particular set of
arguments.
For instance, let us consider the argumentation system containing only
the two arguments “a0: Mr. X is innocent of the murder of Mrs. X” and
“a1: Mr. X is guilty of the murder of Mrs. X”2. These arguments cannot
be accepted together since they are mutually exclusive, and it is difficult to
decide which argument should be accepted. To enforce a0 to be accepted it
is possible to add Argument “a4: Mr. X loves his wife, a man that loves his
wife cannot murder her” which depreciates a1 and leads to accept {a0, a4}.
In this paper we want to propose a framework that generalizes this type
of example (change in argumentation) and allows us to reason about this
2This example is borrowed from Bisquert et al. [12] and is described in more details
inside the paper.
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change. In such a framework, it will be possible to describe several argumen-
tation systems (e.g. for representing an agent’s mind or the current state
of a dialog), to express their properties (for instance their structure, their
sets of acceptable arguments), and to reason about their evolution. Our ap-
proach uses notions of belief change theory and is justified by the following
remarks.
Dynamics of argumentation covers more than enforcement. In the
literature, enforcement is classically considered as typical of a subfield
called “dynamics in argumentation” which has already been studied
broadly (e.g. [50, 43, 14, 24]). Nevertheless, the topic of “dynamics
in argumentation” is more general than enforcement since it aims at
reasoning about change in an argumentation system. For instance some
underlying questions can be “In what extent the arrival of an argument
modifies the accepted arguments?”, “What is the impact of a change
in an argumentation system?”, “Which change is desirable and why?”.
Moreover, the notion of enforcement can also be generalized in order to
consider removal of arguments [12, 13] and addition/removal of attacks
[24, 59] and not only addition of arguments.
This is why our framework enables us to study generalized enforcement
operators and their associated change properties.
Links with planning. From the point of view of an agent that aims at
enforcing the acceptation of a set of arguments, Mr. X’s example is a
one-step planning problem. Indeed, planning (see e.g. [33]) aims at
building a strategy (sequence of actions) to perform in order to solve a
task and so it can be used for handling change in artificial intelligence.
In enforcement, the problem is to find only one action that leads to
satisfy the goal to make accepted a given set of arguments.
Links with persuasion. Studying if a listener has been persuaded by a
change is a natural application of dynamics in argumentation. Indeed,
the persuasion process studied in the literature is a particular planning
process which consists in uttering some arguments (hence producing
some actions) in order to justify a fact or a decision [19, 38, 32, 4] (i.e.
to achieve some enforcements).3 Usually a persuasion dialog involves
several agents that have opposite views on a subject and that aim at
3Moreover argumentation theory has also been used in order to analyze persuasion
dialogs (see e.g. [9, 48, 2, 20, 35]).
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persuading each other to change their opinion. It is possible to dis-
tinguish two kinds of persuasion settings depending on the outcome
evaluation: either one agent has changed her opinion, we call it “pri-
vate persuasion”, or it is publicly proven that the opinion of one agent
is not acceptable, called “public persuasion”.4. In this paper, we situ-
ate ourselves in a context where an agent wants to reason about the
changes that occur on a target argumentation system that represents
the current state of the dialog.
Clearly, our framework is related to planning and persuasion.
Incomplete knowledge and restrictions on operations. Public persu-
asion implies the existence of several agents. In this paper we consider
that the agents may have (1) an incomplete knowledge and (2) that
their actions are restricted with regard to their available knowledge.
For instance, suppose that the two arguments a0 and a1 have been
uttered during a trial. The possibility that a0 is accepted publicly after
the lawyer intervention depends on her awareness of the existence of
an argument defeating a1. If the lawyer does not know a4 or that a4
attacks a1 then she cannot utter it, hence whatever she may say, a0
will not be enforced in the public state of the dialog.
Thus the agents may have restricted possibilities according to their (in-
complete) knowledge and according to the current state of the dialog.
The private knowledge of an agent as well as the target being repre-
sented by argumentation systems, the restricted possibilities of agents
are represented by constraints on the possible changes that they are
authorized to perform on the target system. Enabling constraints is
also a generalization of the enforcement framework, these constraints
are restricting the possible changes that can occur to the target.
Let us assume now that Mr. X was not very vigilant at the beginning
of the audience, he knows that the arguments a0, a1 and a4 have been
presented (a4 for attacking a1). Moreover, he knows that a4 can be
attacked by “a7: Mr. X is known to be venal and cannot love sincerely
his wife”, but he does not know whether the prosecutor had given or
not a7. Then Mr. X may hesitate between several systems that may
4Formally, in private persuasion, it can be checked that the argument representing the
subject of the dialog has changed its status in the argumentation system of one agent.
Public persuasion uses a public argumentation system on which each agent may act by
participating to the dialog; this public argumentation system is the target of every agent
and represents the current state of the dialog.
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represent the current state of the debate about his own guiltiness: there
is a possible state of the debate in which a0 is accepted and another
one in which it is rejected depending on the fact that a7 is present or
not.
This situation is another case of incomplete knowledge, this time it
concerns the target argumentation system. The study of change in
case of incomplete knowledge relates to the domain of belief change
theory developed below.
Belief change in argumentation: revision vs update. The classical ap-
proaches [1, 57, 40, 42] of belief change theory are defining different
ways to take into account the arrival of a new piece of information
and study the properties of change according to these differences. A
main result of our work is to show that when someone utters publicly
an argument, we are facing a change that is called “update” in belief
change theory, since it involves an action that modifies the part of
the external world relating to the current debate. This is very impor-
tant since many works about enforcement (e.g. [44, 25, 28]) are using
the term “revision” which is not always appropriate for the study of
public debates. Indeed, in public argumentation, the public state of
the debate is evolving through the addition (or removal) of arguments
hence there is a change in the world. It means that the agent’s beliefs
(represented by an argumentation system) about the world and more
precisely about the part of the world relating to the debate, should
be updated. In order to better explain the difference between the two
concepts, let us come back to our example.
When Mr. X hears the lawyer uttering Argument a4 then he knows
that a change has occurred to the current state of the debate, hence the
reasoning process amounts to update the representation of the debate
state by the fact that a4 is present in it: it will consist in making a
change on every possible argumentation system that can represent the
current state of the debate such that in every resulting state, a4 is
present. Mr. X does not use the same reasoning about change when he
learns that he is considered as innocent (i.e., that a0 is accepted), since
in that case the dialog current state has not changed. It is Mr. X’s
awareness about the dialog state that has changed, the belief change
operation done in that case is called revision.
As the previous example shows, we do not consider revision as useless
within the context of a debate. For instance, the public or private
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enunciation of an argument might lead to a revision of a hearer’s beliefs
about the discussed topic. However, we focus on the beliefs that an
agent has about the current state of a debate and we distinguish it
from her beliefs about the world representing the discussed topic (e.g.
whether Mr. X actually killed his wife or not). Hence, in this paper,
our study focusses on update operations.
More than planning and persuasion. Belief change theory gives tools
for reasoning about change. This reasoning may be done by a passive
agent who wants to understand what is the state of the debate after
the occurrence of an external change (e.g. the change is caused by
another agent who has uttered an argument). So it is not a planning
problem.
For instance, assume that the lawyer has done an objection about one
argument uttered by the prosecutor. Mr. X may want to know if several
different points of view may still exist in every possible argumentation
system representing the current state of the dialog. This knowledge
could inform him about the remaining time left before a conclusion
will be reached.
In this example, we see that Mr. X is not necessarily interested in
knowing what arguments are accepted but rather in knowing if it is
possible that the target argumentation system has only one set of
acceptable arguments. Moreover he may not be interested in learning
how to do that but only if it has occurred. It is worth noticing that we
are not specifically focusing on persuasion, since these properties do
not only concern acceptability of arguments. Hence, works such as [47,
52, 46, 49, 34] that take a game-theoretic and strategical approach of
persuasion are particular cases of our framework but which are more
focused on the planning aspect of the problem. This is why those
approaches are not directly related to our work since our aim is to
establish rational properties of argumentation and change.
Necessity of a new language. In belief change theory, change properties
are expressed under the form of logical formulae. In order to benefit
from the results coming from belief change theory we have defined a
specific logical language called YALLA. YALLA is not only able to
express information about the structure of an argumentation system
but also the relations between sets of arguments and the principles
underlying the usual semantics. As far as we know, the languages
proposed in the literature do not provide the same expressivity thus
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they would not have allowed us to obtain the new results presented in
this paper, namely the properties concerning acceptance and structure
changes.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we first explain
the basic assumptions governing our approach, then we describe a frame-
work based on abstract argumentation, in which we introduce the notion
of universe, the notion of argumentation graph and the notion of operation
that an agent can execute on a target argumentation graph. Then we recall
the results obtained for characterizing change. In Section 3 we recall the
principles of belief change theory and extend classical update postulates in
order to be able to constrain transitions. In Section 4, we introduce a new
logical language for abstract argumentation in order to describe them, their
properties and their evolution (the YALLA language). Then, in Section 5,
we show that enforcement is a specific kind of update and we provide par-
ticular update properties for change in argumentation that are based on the
characterization results. We end the paper by developing an example in
Section 6, and by comparing our approach to related works in Section 7.
Note that this paper significantly improves the conference paper [15];
more precisely, a formalization using a more complete logical language is
proposed, specific properties playing the role of postulates for argumentation
update are established and additional results are given together with the
proofs of all the propositions (the proofs can be found in Appendix A).
2 Framework
2.1 Working assumptions
In order to avoid any ambiguity, the list below presents the assumptions
made in this work.
(a). We consider that every agent has an argumentation system represent-
ing her knowledge. We do not consider how this system is obtained.
(b). We place ourselves in the context of “public argumentation”, that
is an argumentative process in which several agents are exchanging
arguments and are observed by an audience that will make the final
decision based on the exchanged arguments. In particular, agents are
not in position to influence directly other agents (since they do not
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have access to the argumentation systems of other agents), they are
just able to utter arguments publicly5 and to reason about the change
operations done by the other agents on the public state of the debate.
(c). By arguing, the agents modify directly a special argumentation system
that represents the state of the dialog, called target system. This sys-
tem is empty at the beginning of the dialog and is iteratively modified
by the actions of the agents.
(d). Public argumentation may imply restrictions about what agents are
allowed to do (e.g. in the context of a supervised dialog). Moreover
agents may have preferences over their possible actions.
(e). The agents have only access to two kinds of information: information
about the target system and knowledge about their own system. They
do not know the system of other agents. However, they have access to
what other agents have said through the target system.
(f). The knowledge of an agent about the target system may be partial
since the agents may have doubts about what the other agents might
have said.
(g). We do not consider how the agents revise their own system when
they hear new arguments. In particular, we do not address the issue
whether an agent is actually persuaded or not.
(h). We are not restricting ourselves to standard persuasion where each
agent has a goal to make a particular argument accepted. Instead,
we study the properties that hold after the modification of an argu-
mentation system. Such a study encompasses more properties than
acceptability of one argument, since it may concern any structural
modification of the target system or any evolution of its acceptable
sets of arguments.
(i). We are not focusing on the practical aspect of how an agent can achieve
her goal about the target system, which is related to a planning ap-
proach. We propose a study of the properties induced by the opera-
tions that can be performed on a target system while respecting some
constraints coming from another argumentation system (the one of the
5However, they may, or may not, persuade other agents indirectly, as the other agents
may revise their argumentation system accordingly to what they observe in the target sys-
tem (this point is out of the scope of the paper, see item (g) of the Working assumptions).
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agent that has performed the operation). Our aim is to reason about
the impact of this external change which is related to a belief change
approach.
In the remainder of this work, such a setting will typically be exemplified
by a trial where two agents, the prosecutor and the lawyer, are modifying
a target system representing the current state of a debate. We consider
that the jury will use the final state of the debate to decide the culpability
of the defendant. This example, together with the framework of abstract
argumentation, are presented in the next section.
2.2 Abstract argumentation
Let us consider a set AU of symbols (denoted by lower case letters) rep-
resenting a set of arguments and a relation RU on AU × AU. The pair
(AU,RU), called universe, allows us to represent the set of possible argu-
ments together with their interactions, and can be represented graphically.
More precisely, AU represents a set of arguments usable in a given domain.
For instance, if the domain is a knowledge base then AU and RU are the set
of all arguments and interactions that may be built from the formulae of the
base. In the remainder of this work, we will consider only finite universes,
as in the following example borrowed from [12] where we assume that AU
and RU are explicitly provided.
Example 1. During a trial concerning a defendant (Mr. X), several argu-
ments can be involved to determine his guilt. The set of arguments AU and
the relation RU are given below.
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a0 Mr. X is not guilty of premeditated murder of Mrs. X, his wife.
a1 Mr. X is guilty of premeditated murder of Mrs. X.
a2
The defendant has an alibi, his business associate has solemnly
sworn that he met him at the time of the murder.
a3
The close working business relationships between Mr. X and his
associate induce suspicions about his testimony.
a4
Mr. X loves his wife so deeply that he asked her to marry him
twice. A man who loves his wife cannot be her killer.
a5 Mr. X has a reputation for being promiscuous.
a6
The defendant had no interest to kill his wife, since he was not the
beneficiary of the huge life insurance she contracted.
a7
The defendant is a man known to be venal and his “love” for a very
rich woman could be only lure of profit.
a5 a6 a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
A new definition of argumentation graph6 derives directly from a universe
(AU, RU). It differs slightly from the definition of [31] by the fact that
arguments and interactions can be built according to the universe.
Definition 1. An argumentation graph G on (AU,RU) is a pair (A,R)
where
• A ⊆ AU is the finite set of vertices of G called “arguments” and
• R ⊆ RU ∩ (A×A) is its set of edges, called “attacks”.
The set of argumentation graphs that may be built on the universe (AU,RU)
is denoted by ΓU. In the following, x ∈ G, when x is an argument, is a
shortcut for x ∈ A.
Example 2. The prosecutor is trying to make accepted the guilt of Mr. X.
She is not omniscient and knows only a subset of the arguments of the uni-
verse presented in Example 1 (a subset that is not necessarily shared with
6In the literature, two different expressions can be indifferently found: “argumentation
system” and “argumentation graph”. In the following, we use “argumentation graph”.
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other agents). Moreover, her knowledge being based on the universe, any
argument or attack that does not appear in the universe cannot appear in
her graph. Here is her argumentation graph (GPro):
a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
The prosecutor knows perfectly the current state of the debate, it is repre-
sented by the argumentation graph (GD). Indeed, she had given the argument
a1 against the argument a0 by making explicit the attack from a1 to a0, in-
sisting on the fact that Mr. X is more plausibly guilty than innocent inducing
a preference on the attack from a1 to a0 over the one from a0 to a1 (which
is thus neglected). The lawyer had answered by uttering a4 attacking this
suspicion of guiltiness:
a4 a1 a0
Notation 1. We denote by RA = RU ∩ (A×A) the restriction of RU on
A, i.e. all the attacks concerning arguments of A that are present in the
universe (AU,RU)7.
The acceptable sets of arguments (“extensions”) are computed using
“semantics” based on the following notions:
Definition 2. Given an argumentation graph (A,R), let a ∈ A and S ⊆ A
• S attacks a if and only if ∃x ∈ S such that xRa.
• S is conflict-free if and only if @a, b ∈ S such that aRb.
• S defends an argument a if and only if S attacks every argument at-
tacking a. The set of the arguments defended by S is denoted by F(S);
F is called the characteristic function of (A,R). More generally, S
indirectly defends a if and only if a ∈
⋃
i≥1
F i(S).
• S is an admissible set if and only if it is both conflict-free and defends
all its elements.
7Note that in Definition 1, R is not necessarily equal to RA.
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In this article, we only consider the traditional semantics proposed by [31]:
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics). Given an argumentation graph
(A,R), let E ⊆ A,
• E is a complete extension of (A,R) if and only if E is an admissible
set and every argument which is defended by E belongs to E.
• E is a preferred extension of (A,R) if and only if E is a maximal (with
respect to set-inclusion ⊆) admissible set.
• E is the only grounded extension of (A,R) if and only if E is a minimal
(with respect to ⊆) complete extension.
• E is a stable extension of (A,R) if and only if E is conflict-free and
attacks every argument not belonging to E.
The status of an argument is determined by its presence in the exten-
sions of the selected semantics. For example, an argument is “skeptically
accepted” (resp. “credulously”) if it belongs to all the extensions (resp. at
least to one extension) and is “rejected” if it does not belong to any exten-
sion.
2.3 Change in argumentation
In this section we recall the framework of dynamics in argumentation. In
this subfield, researchers study the impacts of a change operation done by
an agent on an argumentation graph, called the target.
These impacts could involve the arguments, the extensions, the set or the
number of all the extensions, the set of extensions containing a particular
argument as well as its cardinality. For instance, an agent might want to
check if the accepted arguments remain exactly the same after the change,
or if the number of extensions increases after the change.
A particular change, called enforcement, has already been studied in the
literature. The main references about enforcement are [8, 7] that address the
following question: “Is it possible to change a given argumentation graph,
by applying change operations, so that a desired set of arguments becomes
accepted?” (author?) [7] has specified necessary and sufficient conditions
under which enforcements are possible, in the case where change operations
are restricted to the addition of new arguments and new attacks.
In another context, Cayrol et al. [22] have distinguished four elementary
change operations. An elementary change is either adding/ removing one
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argument with a set of attacks involving it, or adding/removing one attack.
Note that in [22] and in [13], operations are defined without considering the
notions of universe, agent’s own argumentation graph and target graph.
Let us develop the interest of studying not only addition of arguments
but also removal. Although dynamics of argumentation graphs has been
largely explored (see for instance [17, 18, 8, 44]), the removal of an argument
has scarcely been mentioned. However, there exist practical applications.
First of all, a speaker may need to occult an argument, in particular when
she does not want, or is not able, to present this argument in front of a
given audience (due to social norms, secrecy, etc.); it is then necessary to
know what would happen in the speaker’s argumentation graph without this
argument. This can be achieved by a removal in her own argumentation
graph. In addition, in the case of an “objection”, this same audience may
force the speaker to remove an argument, in particular when it is regarded as
illegal in the context. Moreover, the removal turns out to be useful in order
to evaluate a posteriori the impact of a precise argument on the output
of the argumentation graph. In particular for evaluating the quality of a
dialog, it is important to be able to differentiate the unnecessarily uttered
arguments from the decisive ones (see [2]: an argument is decisive if its
removal makes it possible to change the conclusion of the dialog).
Note that the removal of an argument a cannot always be reduced to
the addition of a new argument b attacking a, in particular because it may
happen that an attacked argument remains acceptable thanks to the defense
mechanism. Hence, it is more economic to remove an argument rather than
to add one, which might progressively overload the system.
As a consequence, we propose to extend the approach of [22] and [13]
by taking into account the idea of forcing some properties to hold after
an operation in order to obtain a kind of “generalized enforcement”. More
precisely, we introduce a framework where an agent may act on a target
argumentation graph. This agent should follow some constraints about the
actions she has the right to do. For instance, an agent can only advance
arguments that she knows. Hence some restrictions are added on the possible
changes that may take place on the graph. These constraints are represented
by the notion of executable operation.
In Definition 4, we first refine the notion of elementary operation within
the meaning of [22] in four points:
(a). we give a new syntax for taking into account the universe;
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(b). we define an allowed operation with regard to a given agent’s knowl-
edge;
(c). we restrict this notion with regard to its feasibility on the target graph
(it is not possible to add an already present argument or to remove an
argument which is not in the graph); it leads to the notion of executable
operation;
(d). and we study the impact of an operation on an argumentation graph.
Note that considering only elementary operations does not result in a loss of
generality since any change can be translated into a sequence of elementary
operations.
For the following definitions, we consider a particular universe U =
(AU,RU).
Definition 4. Let k be an agent and Gk = (Ak,RAk) be her argumentation
graph and let G = (A,R) be an argumentation graph.
• An operation is a tuple o of the form 〈⊕,Z,RZ〉 or 〈	,Z,∅〉 where
Z ⊆ AU and RZ ⊆ RU and ∀(x, y) ∈ RZ , (x 6= y) and (x ∈ Z or
y ∈ Z).
• An elementary operation is an operation o of the form 〈⊕,Z,RZ〉
or 〈	,Z,∅〉 where card(Z) = 1. With a slight abuse of notation,
an elementary operation will be noted 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 or 〈	, z,∅〉 where
z ∈ AU.
• An elementary operation 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is allowed for k if and only if z ∈
Ak and Rz ⊆ RAk .8 An elementary operation 〈	, z,∅〉 is allowed for
k if z ∈ Ak.
• An operation 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable by k on G if it is an operation
allowed for k such that z /∈ A and (∀(x, y) ∈ Rz, x ∈ A or y ∈ A).
An operation 〈	, z,∅〉 is executable by k on G if it is an operation
allowed for k such that z ∈ A.
• An operation o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 executable by k on G provides a new
argumentation graph G′ = o(G) = (A ∪ {z},R ∪ Rz), an operation
o = 〈	, z,∅〉 executable by k on G provides a new argumentation graph
G′ = o(G) = (A \ {z},R \ {(x, y) ∈ R | x = z or y = z}).
8Note that in the case of an argument addition, it is possible to add an argument with
only a part of the known attacks and therefore to “lie by omission”.
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An extension of G′ will be denoted by E ′.
The first item of Definition 4 implies that z cannot be a self-attacking ar-
gument. However, handling this kind of argument may be useful for instance
for modeling a situation where an agent uses a questionable argument in or-
der to make another argument undecided. Nevertheless, in the literature
of the domain, forbidding self-attacking arguments is usually considered as
a realistic constraint: a self-attacking argument is the symptom of a non-
sense.9
Example 3. From AU and RU given in Example 1, several elementary
operations can be given, e.g., 〈⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)}〉 and 〈	, a4,∅〉.
Among the elementary operations, the prosecutor is only allowed to use
those concerning arguments she knows (with regard to GPro given in Exam-
ple 2). For instance, she is allowed to use 〈⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)}〉, but she is not
allowed to use 〈⊕, a5, {(a5, a4)}〉.
Finally, the prosecutor may execute 〈⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)}〉 on GD, but she
may not execute 〈	, a7,∅〉 on GD, since a7 is not in GD.
2.4 Change characterizations, planning and belief change
A planning problem in argumentation could consider the goals of the agent
and how she can act (i.e. produce a change) on an argumentation graph. If
we want to decide which operation an agent has to perform so that a par-
ticular property is satisfied in the resulting graph, a naive approach would:
• compute all the operations that are executable by the agent,
• compute the extensions of the argumentation graphs obtained by each
of these operations and
• check if the property is satisfied in each graph.
The naive approach is expensive, since it requires to compute the exten-
sions of every graph obtained by an executable operation. Some works aim
at addressing this efficiency issue by providing incremental computation of
9Note that this restriction is not required for establishing Theorem 3 nor for Proposi-
tions 9 and 10. It has been done because all the characterizations that are referred in [14]
concern graphs with no self-attacking arguments. Hence an additional study should be
necessary in order to propose appropriate characterizations integrating self-attacking ar-
guments.
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extensions [5, 6] or by defining strong equivalence classes of argumentation
graphs that have the same extensions for any addition of arguments [45].
In this paper, we are interested in reasoning about change i.e. know-
ing the properties that are linked to the modifications of an argumentation
graph. To be more efficient this study should find ways to reason about
the impact of the operations without computing all the extensions. This
can be done by using change characterizations which were studied in [22]
and [14].10 In these papers, a typology to classify the different properties
describing a change operation has been introduced. This typology considers
change at three levels:
• the set of extensions in Dung’s sense (e.g., the set of extensions is
empty before the change and not empty after the change),
• the sets of accepted arguments (e.g., all the arguments skeptically ac-
cepted before the change are still skeptically accepted after the change)
and
• the status of some given argument (e.g., an accepted argument may
become rejected after the change).
Then [22, 14] provide characterizations for these properties: i.e. conditions
on the argumentation graph and on the change operation that are necessary
and/or sufficient to guarantee that the properties are satisfied. The results
are twofold: they can be considered as a guide for selecting the change oper-
ation to perform in order to obtain a desired property on an argumentation
graph (e.g. in a planning perspective) and they may also be used as a tool
for predicting the result of a change operation in a given context, or for
inferring properties about an initial state given information about the oper-
ation performed and the result obtained (in a perspective of reasoning about
change).
Since a characterization gives necessary and/or sufficient conditions about
change properties with regard to a kind of operation and a given semantics,
the characterizations can be used to propose another approach which can
be applied both for planning (to achieve a given goal represented by a prop-
erty) or for reasoning about change (to check if a property holds after an
unspecified operation done by an external agent). This approach is able to:
• compute all the operations that are executable by the agent,
10See [16] for a tool that uses these characterizations.
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• select characterizations that concern the considered property,
• check if one of the executable operations satisfies the conditions of one
of the selected characterizations.
If an executable operation satisfies the conditions of a characterization, then
it is certain that the associated property is satisfied. In [14], we provide
many results concerning the grounded, stable and preferred semantics. Be-
low, we give four examples of characterizations, all concerning the grounded
semantics.
Characterization 1 ([14]). Let (A,R) be an argumentation graph repre-
sented by G, and E its grounded extension. For any operation o of the form
〈⊕, z,Rz〉 executable by an agent on G, if
• ∀x ∈ A such that (x, z) ∈ Rz, ∃y ∈ E such that (y, x) ∈ R and
• @y ∈ A such that (z, y) ∈ Rz
then E ′ = E ∪ {z} where E ′ denotes the grounded extension of G′ = o(G).
The property involved in this first characterization concerns a kind of
“monotony” of the extension. Indeed, if an operation adds an argument z
under the grounded semantics, such that z is defended by the current ex-
tension and z does not attack any argument, then we know (see Proposition
12.3 of [14]), without any computation, that z will become accepted while
being certain that the previously accepted arguments remain accepted after
the change.
Characterization 2 ([14]). Let (A,R) be an argumentation graph repre-
sented by G, and E its grounded extension. For any operation o of the form
〈⊕, z,Rz〉 executable by an agent on G, for any argument x ∈ A ∪ {z}, if
• @y ∈ A such that (y, z) ∈ Rz and
• {z} indirectly defends x and
• x 6∈ E
then x ∈ E ′ where E ′ denotes the grounded extension of G′ = o(G).
This characterization (established by Proposition 15 in [14] 11) concerns
“enforcement” of an argument x, as seen in Section 2.3. Like Characteri-
zation 1, this characterization also involves the operation of addition of an
11Here we extend the proposition to the case where x = z.
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argument z. Thanks to this characterization, we know (without requiring a
new computation of the extensions) that if an operation adds an argument
z under the grounded semantics, such that z is not attacked and indirectly
defends another argument x which was not accepted, then x will become
accepted.
Characterization 3 ([14]). Let (A,R) be an argumentation graph repre-
sented by G, and E its grounded extension. For any operation o = 〈	, z,∅〉
executable by an agent on G, if
• E 6= ∅ and
• ∃x ∈ A such that (x, z) ∈ R
then E ′ 6= ∅, where E ′ denotes the grounded extension of G′ = o(G).
This characterization (established by Proposition 10.1	 in [14]) enables
us to know, without any computation, that if an operation removes an ar-
gument z such that z is attacked by at least one argument of G and knowing
that the extension was not empty before the change, then the extension
obtained after the change will not be empty. This can be useful when one
wants either to act in order to make sure that the discussion will not be fruit-
less (planning perspective), or in a perspective of reasoning about change if
one wants to know if the discussion is still opened after observing a given
operation performed by another agent.
Characterization 4 ([14]). Let (A,R) be an argumentation graph repre-
sented by G, and E its grounded extension. For any operation o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉
executable by an agent on G, if
• @x ∈ E such that (z, x) ∈ Rz and
• ∃y ∈ A such that (y, z) ∈ Rz and @x ∈ E such that (x, y) ∈ R
then E ′ = E, where E ′ denotes the grounded extension of G′ = o(G).
This last characterization (coming from Proposition 12.1 in [14]) con-
cerns the non evolution of the conclusion. Thanks to it, we know (without
requiring a new computation of the extensions) that if an operation adds
an argument z under the grounded semantics, such that z does not attack
any argument of the grounded extension while not being defended by this
extension, then the extension will remain the same after the change. In a
planning perspective, this result could be useful in situations where it is
important to speak but without changing the direction of the debate (for a
politician, for instance).
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Example 4. From Example 2, we know that the prosecutor is trying to
make accepted the argument a1. So she wants to have a1 ∈ E ′ and she can
use Characterization 2. From Example 3, several executable operations are
available and among the executable operations, 〈⊕, a7, {(a7, a4)}〉 satisfies
the conditions of Characterization 2. Hence, the prosecutor is certain to
achieve her goal if she executes this operation.
Mr. X can also use Characterization 2 after having heard the prosecutor
uttering a7 and attacking a4 (that had been said previously in the debate).
This characterization will help Mr. X to understand that at this stage of the
debate his guiltiness is accepted.
The fact that an agent may reason about operations done on an argu-
mentation graph ensuring that a property holds on this graph recalls belief
change theory, where an agent has to change her beliefs in order to take into
account a new piece of information. Moreover, characterizations are prop-
erties about elementary change operations performed on an argumentation
system. On the other hand, belief change postulates are properties about a
belief change operator applied to a knowledge base. Hence, it seems inter-
esting to draw a parallel between these two domains and to try to use the
characterizations as supplementary properties playing the role of additional
postulates for an argumentation-specific belief change operator.
To explain this parallel, we briefly recall background on belief change
theory in the next section.
3 Belief change theory
In the field of belief change theory, the paper of AGM ([1]) has introduced
the concept of “belief revision”. Belief revision aims at defining how to inte-
grate a new piece of information into a set of initial beliefs while preserving
consistency. Beliefs are represented by sentences of a formal language.
A very important distinction between belief revision and belief update
was first established in [56]. The difference is in the nature of the new
piece of information: either it is completing the knowledge of the world or
it informs that there is a change in the world. More precisely, update is
a process which takes into account a physical evolution of the world while
revision is a process taking into account an epistemic evolution (i.e., it is
the knowledge about the world that is evolving).
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Considering change in argumentation, we rather face an update problem,
since we are studying properties concerning the evolution of an argumen-
tation system (specifically, the target system) due to a change operation
executed on it by an agent. Graphs are playing the role of states of the
world.12
3.1 Classical update postulates
We need to recall some background on belief update. An update operator
([56, 39]) is a function mapping a knowledge base ϕ, expressed in a propo-
sitional logic L based on a vocabulary V , and a new piece of information
α ∈ L , to a new knowledge base ϕ  α ∈ L . Here, ϕ represents knowledge
about a system in an initial state and ϕ  α ∈ L represents the system
after this evolution. Ω denotes the set of all interpretations of L (states of
the world), [ϕ] denotes the set of models of the formula ϕ ([ϕ] ⊆ Ω). Each
state of the world can be described unequivocally thanks to a characteristic
formula:
Definition 5. A function f : Ω → L such that ∀ω ∈ Ω, [f(ω)] = {ω} is a
characteristic function for L . f(ω) is the characteristic formula associated
to ω by f .
Remark 1. The function Φ s.t. ∀ω ∈ Ω, Φ(ω) = ∧v∈V,ω|=v v∧∧v∈V,ω|=¬v ¬v
is a characteristic function.
The characteristic function mentioned in the above remark will be used
in the remainder of this paper.
In belief update, the input α should be interpreted as the projection
of the expected effects of some “explicit change”, or more precisely, the
expected effect of the action “make α true”. The key property of belief
update is Katsuno and Mendelzon’s Postulate U8 which tells that models
of ϕ are updated independently (contrarily to belief revision). We recall
here the postulates of Katsuno and Mendelzon [39]: ∀ϕ,ψ, α, β ∈ L ,
U1: ϕ  α |= α
U2: ϕ |= α =⇒ [ϕ  α] = [ϕ]
12A revision approach would apply to situations in which the agent learns some infor-
mation about the initial argumentation graph and wants to correct her knowledge about
it. This would mean that the argumentation graph has not changed but the awareness of
the agent has evolved. See for instance Mr. X’s example given in Section 1.
19
U3: [ϕ] 6= ∅ and [α] 6= ∅ =⇒ [ϕ  α] 6= ∅
U4: [ϕ] = [ψ] and [α] = [β] =⇒ [ϕ  α] = [ψ  β]
U5: (ϕ  α) ∧ β |= ϕ  (α ∧ β)
U8: [(ϕ ∨ ψ)  α] = [(ϕ  α) ∨ (ψ  α)]
U9: if card([ϕ]) = 1 then [(ϕ  α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕ  (α ∧ β) |= (ϕ  α) ∧ β
(where card(E) denotes the cardinality of the set E)13
These postulates allow Katsuno and Mendelzon to write the following
representation theorem concerning update, namely, an operator satisfying
these postulates can be defined by means of a ternary preference relation on
states of the world (see [39]).
Definition 6. A faithful assignment is a function that associates with each
ω ∈ Ω a complete preorder ω such that14 ∀ω1 6= ω ∈ Ω, ω ≺ω ω1.
Theorem 1 ([39]). There is an operator  : L ×L → L satisfying U1,
U2, U3, U4, U5, U8, U9 if and only if there is a faithful assignment that
associates with each ω ∈ Ω a complete preorder15, denoted by ω such that
∀ϕ, α ∈ L , [ϕ  α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
{ω′ ∈ [α] such that ∀ω′′ ∈ [α], ω′ ω ω′′}.
This set of postulates has already been broadly discussed in the literature
(see e.g., [37, 36, 30]). Two postulates have been particularly criticized:
PostulateU2 imposes inertia (which is not always suitable) andU3 imposes
that any update is always possible (which could also be viewed as a too
strong assertion).
In order to answer to these critics, a natural extension is to restrain the
possible changes that can be done on a state of the world, and hence give a
different definition of update which can take into account some constraints
about the possible transitions. Moreover, this extension becomes necessary
for us in order to take into account the notion of executable operation in
the argumentation framework (let us recall that some operations are not au-
thorized on some argumentation graphs; executable operations are the ones
13Note that card([ϕ]) = 1 if and only if ∃ω ∈ Ω such that [ϕ] = {ω}.
14Here, and in the rest of this article, ≺ is defined classically from  as follows: x ≺ y
iff (x  y and y 6 x)
15Postulates U6 and U7 are not considered here since the set U1-U8 is only related to
a family of partial preorders while replacing U6-U7 by U9 ensures a family of complete
preorders.
20
that are authorized). Hence, we have chosen to introduce a set of authorized
transitions T which restricts accessible states of the world. Consequently,
we have adapted update postulates in order to restrict possible transitions,
and to define a representation theorem that allows us to have a complete
preorder over the states of the world.
Note that the idea to define an update operator based on a set of au-
thorized transitions was first introduced by Cordier and Siegel [23]. Their
proposal goes beyond our idea since they allow for a greater expressivity by
using prioritized transition constraints. However, this proposal is only de-
fined at a semantic level (in terms of preorders between states of the world),
hence they do not provide postulates nor representation theorem associ-
ated with their update operator. In addition, our work generalizes Herzig’s
approach [36] which proposes to restrict possible updates by taking into ac-
count integrity constraints (i.e., formulae that should hold before and after
update) since integrity constraints can be encoded with a set of authorized
transitions (but the converse is not possible).
3.2 Update postulates respecting transition constraints
In this section, we define new postulates considering constraints on transi-
tions. For that purpose, we first define a new update operator taking into
account a set T of authorized transitions between states of the world.
Definition 7 (Update operator related to T ). Given T ⊆ Ω× Ω,
• ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ L , the pair (ϕ,ψ) satisfies T , denoted by (ϕ,ψ) |= T , iff
([ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀ω ∈ [ϕ], ∃ω′ ∈ [ψ], (ω, ω′) ∈ T ).
• An update operator related to T , denoted ♦T , is a mapping from
L ×L to L which associates with any formula ϕ and any formula α
a formula, denoted by ϕ♦T α, such that (ϕ,ϕ♦T α) |= T .
In other words, if ϕ gives information about an initial state of the world
then ϕ♦T α characterizes the states of the world that can be obtained from
states satisfying ϕ by a change belonging to T .
Now, we define a set of rational postulates for ♦T . These postulates
aim at translating the idea of update under authorized transitions. Some
postulates coming from update are suitable, namely U1, since it ensures
that after an update the constraints imposed by α hold. U2 postulate is
optional, it imposes that if α already holds in a state of the world then
updating α means no change. This postulate imposes inertia as a preferred
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change, this may not be desirable in all situations. For instance, Dubois
et al. [30] proposes to not impose inertia and to allow for update failure
even if the formulae are consistent; this has been done by introducing an
unreachable world in order to dispose of an upper bound of the proximity
from a current world to an unreachable world. U3 imposes that if a formula
holds for some states of the world and if the update piece of information
also holds for some state then the result of update should give a non empty
set of states. Here, we do not want to impose that any update is always
possible since some state of the world may be unreachable from others. So
we propose to replace U3 by a postulate called E3 based on the set of
authorized transitions T : ∀ϕ,ψ, α, β ∈ L
E3: [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ if and only if (ϕ, α) |= T .
Due to the definition of (ϕ, α) |= T , E3 handles two cases of update
impossibility: no possible transition and no state of the world satisfying ϕ
or α, as it will be shown in Proposition 3.
U4 is suitable in our setting since update operators are defined seman-
tically.
U5 is also suitable for update since it says that states of the world
updated by α in which β already holds are states in which the constraints
α and β are updated. Due to the fact that we wanted to allow for update
failure, this postulate has been restricted to “complete” formulae (i.e., such
that card([ϕ]) = 1):
E5: if card([ϕ]) = 1 then (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β |= ϕ♦T (α ∧ β).
U8 captures the decomposability of update with respect to a set of
possible input states of the world. We slightly change this postulate in order
to take into account the possibility of failure, namely if updating something
is impossible then updating it on a larger set of states is also impossible,
else the update can be decomposable:
E8: if ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅) or ([ψ] 6= ∅ and [ψ ♦T α] = ∅)
then [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅
else [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = [(ϕ♦T α) ∨ (ψ ♦T α)].
Postulate U9 is a kind of converse of U5, restricted to a “complete”
formula ϕ. This restriction is required in the proof of Theorem 1 as well as
in Theorem 2.
22
Note that the presence of U1 in the set of postulates characterizing an
update operator is not necessary since U1 can be derived from E3, E5 and
E8.
Proposition 1. U1 is implied by E3, E5 and E8.
Using Proposition 1, the following proposition establishes the fact that
five postulates are necessary and sufficient to define an update operator,
namely E3, U4, E5, E8 and U9.
Proposition 2. E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 constitute a minimal set: no postu-
late of this set can be derived from the others.
Hence, we get a new set of postulates for update respecting transition
constraints:
E3: [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ if and only if (ϕ, α) |= T
U4: [ϕ] = [ψ] and [α] = [β] =⇒ [ϕ♦T α] = [ψ ♦T β]
E5: if card([ϕ]) = 1 then (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β |= ϕ♦T (α ∧ β)
E8: if ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅) or ([ψ] 6= ∅ and [ψ ♦T α] = ∅)
then [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅
else [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = [(ϕ♦T α) ∨ (ψ ♦T α)]
U9: if card([ϕ]) = 1 then [(ϕ♦T α)∧β] 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕ♦T (α∧β) |= (ϕ♦T α)∧β
These postulates allow us to write the following representation theorem
concerning update, namely, an update operator satisfying these postulates
can be defined by means of the definition of a family of preorders on states
of the world.
Definition 8. Given a set T ⊆ Ω×Ω of authorized transitions, an assign-
ment respecting T is a function that associates with each ω ∈ Ω a complete
preorder ω such that ∀ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, if (ω, ω1) ∈ T and (ω, ω2) 6∈ T then
ω1 ≺ω ω2.
Theorem 2. Given a set T ⊆ Ω× Ω of authorized transitions, there is an
operator ♦T : L ×L → L satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 if and only if
there is an assignment respecting T such that ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ϕ, α ∈ L ,
(1) [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃ω ∈ [ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅
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(2) [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α] otherwise
(3) [Φ(ω)♦T α] =
{
ω1 ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω1 ∈ [α] and
(ω, ω1) ∈ T and
(∀ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2)
}
In other words, (1) and (2) allow us to define the update of a formula ϕ
wrt the update of its individual models, with (1) stating that if one of them
cannot be updated the whole update fails, and (2) stating that otherwise
the whole update corresponds to the union of the individual updates (an
individual update being described by (3)).
This result is a significant headway,16 but as usual for a representation
theorem, it gives only a link between the existence of an assignment of
preorders and the fact that an update operator satisfies the postulates. It
does not give any clue about how to assign these preorders i.e., how to
design precisely an update operator.
Example 5. Let us consider three variables xx, xy and t meaning respec-
tively “Mrs. X is alive”, “Mr. X is alive”, “Mr. and Mrs. X are together
in the same room”. Suppose that we know that at a given time point Mr. X
is alive (xy), we do not know whether Mrs. X is alive and if they are to-
gether. However we know that Mrs. X cannot be alive if they are together,
this can be expressed by ϕ = xy ∧ (t→ ¬xx). It means that among the eight
worlds: w1 = (xx, xy, t), w2 = (xx, xy, t), w3 = (xx, xy, t), w4 = (xx, xy, t),
w5 = (xx, xy, t), w6 = (xx, xy, t), w7 = (xx, xy, t), w8 = (xx, xy, t) there
are three possible worlds representing the situation: w2, w5 and w6 (i.e.,
[ϕ] = {ω2, ω5, ω6}). We know that some transitions are not possible be-
tween two consecutive time points: it is impossible that Mrs. X (respectively
Mr. X) rises from the dead, i.e., every transition from (xx, .., ..) to (xx, .., ..)
(respectively (.., xy, ..) to (.., xy, ..)) does not belong to T .
A gunshot has been heard and “Mrs. X was found dead”. It means that
the world has evolved in such a way that xx is false, which can be expressed
by α = ¬xx. Let us consider a particular assignment satisfying T with the
following preference relations on transitions:
• ∀i 6= 6, w6 ≺w5 wi: if Mrs. X is dead and Mr. X is alive in the same
16Note that the condition part in the third item of this theorem could be simplified into:
ω1 ∈ [α] and (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α], ω1 ω ω2 by taking into account the constraints
on ω stated in Definition 8. Nevertheless, the current formulation gives a more explicit
result.
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room, then it is likely that at the next time point Mr. X has left since
he does not like to stay with dead people.
• ∀i 6= 2, w2 ≺w2 wi: if Mr. and Mrs. X are alive and not together
then it is more plausible that at the next time point it is still the case,
otherwise it is more plausible that they met and stay alive than that
one of them dies, which in turn is more plausible than both of them
died separately and so on17: w1 ≺w2 {w4, w6} ≺w2 {w3, w5, w7, w8}.
• ∀i 6= 6, w6 ≺w6 wi: if Mrs. X is dead and Mr. X is alive but elsewhere,
then it is more plausible that it is still the case at the next time point.
In that case [ϕ♦T α] = [xy ∧ (t→ ¬xx)♦T ¬xx] = {w6} since for every
w ∈ {w2, w5, w6}, w6 ≺w w′ ∀w′ s.t. w′ |= ¬xx and (w,w′) ∈ T .18
From Theorem 2 we can deduce two simple cases of impossibility: if the
initial situation described by ϕ or the imposed property α are impossible
then the update is impossible (this result is a kind of converse of U3).
Proposition 3. If ♦T satisfies E3, U4, E5, E8 and U9 then ([ϕ] = ∅ or
[α] = ∅) =⇒ [ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
The following property ensures that if an update is possible then a more
general update is also possible.
Proposition 4. If ♦T satisfies E3 then ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ ♦T α] 6= ∅) =⇒
(∀γ, [ϕ♦T (α ∨ γ)] 6= ∅).
Note that there are some cases where U2 is not required together with
E3, U4, E5, E8 and U9. If U2 is imposed then the update operator is
associated with a preorder in which a given state is always closer to itself
than to any other state of the world. This is why U2 imposes to have a
faithful assignment (see Definition 6). In that case, the relation represented
by T should be reflexive.
17w5 is also considered as less plausible since it would require two steps for passing from
w2 to w5 namely killing Mrs. X and gathering Mr. X and Mrs. X; moreover we know that
Mr. X does not like to be in such an equivocal situation.
18Note that the reasoning process would have been different if the coroner had discovered
that Mrs. X was already dead before the gunshot. This process is a revision and would
have amount to complete the initial knowledge hence to deduce that at the initial time,
only two worlds were possible w5 and w6, denoted [xy ∧ (t→ ¬xx) ? ¬xx] = {w5, w6}.
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Proposition 5. Given a reflexive relation T ⊆ Ω×Ω of authorized transi-
tions, there is an operator ♦T : L ×L → L satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8,
U9 that satisfies U2 if and only if there is a faithful assignment respecting
T defined as in Theorem 2.
If we remove the restriction about authorized transitions then we recover
Katsuno and Mendelzon theorem, namely:
Proposition 6. If T = Ω×Ω then ♦T satisfies U2, E3, U4, E5, E8, U9
if and only if ♦T satisfies U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U8 and U9.
We have seen in the previous sections a framework in which an agent
can change an argumentation graph. We have also seen that these notions
are close to belief change theory, in particular since we now consider au-
thorized transitions in the context of belief update. To make concrete the
parallel between these two domains, in the next section we define a logical
language able to express classical notions of abstract argumentation. This
new language is introduced in order to be in position to propose an update
operator and a set of properties specific to change in abstract argumentation
in Section 5.
4 YALLA: logical theory for abstract argumenta-
tion graphs
Our purpose is to build a first-order logical theory capable of describing
abstract argumentation graphs, especially the attack relation between sets
of arguments.
So, we first define a logical language with specific axioms and we show
how formulae of the language can be interpreted by argumentation graphs.
Then, we slightly modify this logical theory for describing argumentation
graphs built on a given universe. Lastly we provide formulae that express
the criteria underlying the traditional argumentation semantics.
4.1 The basic language YALLA
The signature of a first-order logical language lays down the set of individual
constants (Vconst), the set of function symbols (Vf ) and the set of predicate
symbols (VP ). The signature Σ of our basic language YALLA is defined as
follows:19
19Each function or predicate symbol has an arity which is indicated by an exponent
attached to the symbol.
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Definition 9 (Signature). Σ = (Vconst, Vf , VP ) where Vconst = {c⊥}, Vf =
{union2} and VP = {B2,⊆2}.
The terms and formulae of YALLA are built up from the logical sym-
bols (logical connectives, quantifiers and variables) and the symbols in the
signature, thanks to the syntactic rules of first-order logic.20
4.1.1 Structure over Σ
We define the semantics of YALLA thanks to a structure, on which terms
and formulae will be interpreted. A structure is associated with an argu-
mentation graph (A,R). So, the domain of the structure is D = 2A, the set
of sets of arguments, which contains at least the empty set.
Definition 10 (Structure). A structureM of signature Σ, associated with
(A,R), is a pair (D, I) where D = 2A is the domain of the structure and I
is an interpretation function associating:
• the empty set to the constant symbol c⊥,
• the binary set theoretic union operator (function from D2 to D) to the
function symbol union,
• the binary set theoretic inclusion relation (binary relation on D2) to
the predicate symbol ⊆,
• the binary relation of attack between sets of arguments induced by R,21
and defined by S1RS2 if and only if ∃x1 ∈ S1, ∃x2 ∈ S2, (x1Rx2), to
the predicate symbol B.
Note that the first two items allow to interpret variable-free terms, and
the last two allow to interpret variable-free atomic formulae on a given
structure M. Then, we rely on the Tarski truth definition rules (see for
instance [51]) to interpret any closed formula.22 For instance, a formula
∀x ϕ (resp. ∃x ϕ) is interpreted by True on the structureM if and only if
ϕ is interpreted by True on M for each (resp. at least one) assignment of
an element of D to the variable x.
20The reader is referred to [51] for instance, for a detailed presentation of mathematical
logic.
21For sake of simplicity, the attack relation between sets of arguments is denoted with
the same symbol as the attack relation between arguments.
22A formula is closed if each variable x of the formula appears in a subformula of the
form ∀x (ϕ) or ∃x (ϕ).
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Definition 11 (Model). Let ϕ be a closed formula of the language. A
structure M is a model of ϕ, denoted by M |= ϕ, if and only if ϕ is inter-
preted by True on the structureM.
In the following, we will write (A,R) |= ϕ for M |= ϕ, when M is
associated with (A,R). Indeed, in that case, the structure M is entirely
determined by (A,R).
4.1.2 Specific axioms
Among all the formulae that can be built on the signature Σ, some formulae
characterize the structures defined above. We will consider these formulae
as the specific axioms of the logical theory describing an abstract argumen-
tation graph. Let x, y, z be variables of YALLA:
Axioms for set inclusion
• ∀x (c⊥ ⊆ x)
• ∀x (x ⊆ x)
• ∀x, y, z ((x ⊆ y ∧ y ⊆ z) =⇒ x ⊆ z).
Axioms for set operators
• ∀x, y ((x ⊆ union(x, y))
• ∀x, y ((y ⊆ union(x, y))
• ∀x, y, z (((x ⊆ z) ∧ (y ⊆ z)) =⇒ (union(x, y) ⊆ z)))
Axioms combining set-inclusion and attack relation
• ∀x, y, z (((x B y) ∧ (x ⊆ z)) =⇒ (z B y))
• ∀x, y, z (((x B y) ∧ (y ⊆ z)) =⇒ (x B z))
• ∀x, y, z ((union(x, y) B z) =⇒ ((x B z) ∨ (y B z)))
• ∀x, y, z ((x B union(y, z)) =⇒ ((x B y) ∨ (x B z)))
It is easy to prove that the above axioms hold in any structureM of sig-
nature Σ. For instance, let ϕ denote the first axiom combining set-inclusion
and attack relation. Let M be any structure of signature Σ. We have to
prove that ϕ is interpreted by True on M. It holds since for any t1, t2, t3
subsets of 2A, if t1Rt2 and t1 ⊆ t3 then t3Rt2.
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4.2 The language YALLAU
Now, we propose a first-order logical theory capable of describing abstract
argumentation graphs built on a given finite universe (AU,RU), where
AU = {a1, a2, · · · , ak} with k = card(AU).
For that purpose, we have to enrich the language. First, the signature
must include as many symbols as elements in 2AU . As a consequence, the
domain of a structure must enable to interpret all these symbols. Then,
we must be able to distinguish between all the terms those which can be
interpreted on a given argumentation graph based on the universe (AU,RU).
That is the reason why we add the predicate symbol on.
The new signature ΣU is defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Signature). ΣU = (Vconst, Vf , VP ) where Vconst = {c⊥, c1, . . . ,
cp} with p = 2k − 1, Vf = {union2} and VP = {on1,B2,⊆2}.
4.2.1 Structure over ΣU
The semantics of YALLAU is defined thanks to a structure over ΣU. Such
a structure is associated with an argumentation graph (A,R) built on the
universe (AU,RU). We have A ⊆ AU and R ⊆ RU ∩ (A × A). So, the
domain of the structure is D = 2AU , which is not empty.
Definition 13 (Structure). A structure M of signature ΣU, associated
with (A,R), is a pair (D, I) where D = 2AU is the domain of the structure
and I is an interpretation function associating:
(a). a unique element of D to each constant symbol ci (in particular the
empty set is associated with the constant symbol c⊥),
(b). the binary set theoretic union operator (function from D2 to D) to the
function symbol union,
(c). the characterization of the subsets of A to the predicate symbol on:
on(S) if and only if S ⊆ A
(d). the binary set theoretic inclusion relation (binary relation on D2) to
the predicate symbol ⊆,
(e). the binary relation of attack between sets of arguments induced by R,
and defined by S1RS2 if and only if S1 ⊆ A,S2 ⊆ A and ∃x1 ∈
S1, ∃x2 ∈ S2, (x1Rx2), to the predicate symbol B.
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As for the language YALLA, a structure M over ΣU is entirely deter-
mined by (A,R) built on AU.
For short, in the following, we identify t with the subset of A which
interprets t when t denotes a term of YALLAU.
Example 6. Let us consider the universe AU = {a1, a2, a3}, RU = {(a1, a2),
(a3, a2)}. Let (A1,R1) and (A2,R2) be the two argumentation graphs built
on the universe (AU,RU) defined by: A1 = {a1, a2, a3}, R1 = {(a1, a2)},
A2 = {a1, a2}, R2 = {(a1, a2)}.
a1 a2 a3
(a) Universe (AU,RU).
a1 a2 a3
(b) Argumentation graph (A1,R1).
a1 a2
(c) Argumentation graph (A2,R2).
Figure 1: Examples of argumentation graphs
Let ϕ1 be the formula on({a1, a2, a3})∧({a1} B {a2}) and ϕ2 the formula
on({a1, a2}) ∧ ({a1} B {a2}).
We have (A1,R1) |= ϕ1, (A1,R1) |= ϕ2, (A2,R2) |= ϕ2. However
(A2,R2) is not a model of ϕ1, since {a1, a2, a3} is not a subset of A2.
Let ϕ′2 be the formula on({a1, a2}). We also have (A2,R2) |= ϕ′2.
4.2.2 Specific axioms
For describing the structures over ΣU we need all the axioms presented in
Section 4.1.2 augmented by the following ones: let x, y, z be variables of
YALLAU,
Axioms for the predicate on
• on(c⊥)
• ∀x, y ((on(x) ∧ (y ⊆ x)) =⇒ on(y))
• ∀x, y ((on(x) ∧ on(y)) =⇒ on(union(x, y))
• ∀x, y ((x B y) =⇒ (on(x) ∧ on(y)))
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So far, we have proposed a first-order logical theory for describing ar-
gumentation graphs built on a given universe AU. We have proposed an
axiomatisation and a semantics. Let AXU denote the set of the specific
axioms given in 4.1.2 expanded by those given above, that is to say the
axioms for the predicate on, the axioms for set inclusion, the axioms for set
operators and the axioms combining set-inclusion and attack relation.
The following results hold:
• The axiomatisation is sound: it is easy to prove that each structure is
a model of the axioms
• The axiomatisation is complete in the following sense: Let ϕ be a
formula of the language YALLAU. Let Sys be a sound and complete
axiomatic system for predicate calculus, with its logical axioms and
inference rules. We denote by AXU `Sys ϕ the fact that ϕ is provable
in Sys augmented by the specific axioms of AXU. We recall that
AXU |= ϕ means that ϕ logically follows from AXU (or equivalently
each structure which is a model of AXU is also a model of ϕ). Then
it holds23 that AXU |= ϕ if and only if AXU `Sys ϕ.
4.2.3 Examples of formulae in YALLAU
In the following, the constant symbols of the language YALLAU will be
denoted by the elements of 2AU .
We present several examples illustrating the expressive power of YALLAU.
In particular, we show that we can precisely describe an argumentation
graph by its characteristic formula. Moreover, we are able to express knowl-
edge held by an agent about an incompletely known argumentation graph.
Definition 14 (Formula describing an argumentation graph). The
function ΦU associated with YALLAU is defined by:
ΦU : ΓU → YALLAU
(A,R) 7→ on(A) ∧ ∧x∈AU\A ¬on({x}) ∧∧
(x,y)∈R ({x} B {y}) ∧
∧
(x,y)∈RU\R ¬({x} B {y})
ΦU(A,R) is called the characteristic formula24 of the graph (A,R).
Proposition 7. (A,R) is the unique model of ΦU(A,R).
23It is a consequence of the Godel’s completeness theorem [51, 41].
24Note that it should not be confused with the characteristic function of an argumenta-
tion graph that is used, for instance, for defining the grounded semantics (see Definition 2).
31
Example 7. Let us consider the argumentation graphs (A1,R1) and (A2,R2)
from Example 6. Following Definition 14, we have:25
ΦU(A1,R1) = on({a1, a2, a3}) ∧ ({a1} B {a2}) ∧ ¬({a3} B {a2})
ΦU(A2,R2) = on({a1, a2}) ∧ ¬(on({a3})) ∧ ({a1} B {a2}) ∧ ¬({a3} B {a2})
YALLAU allows us to express incomplete knowledge about (AU,RU):
Example 8. Let us consider the universe (AU, RU) given in Figure 2.
a5 a6 a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
Figure 2: Universe (AU,RU).
Assume that Agent Aga has only a partial knowledge about the argumen-
tation graph built by Agent Agb. Indeed, Aga hesitates between two possible
situations for Agb’s graph, namely (A1,R1) and (A2,R2) given in Figures 3a
and 3b.
a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
(a) Argumentation graph (A1,R1).
a2
a4 a1 a0
(b) Argumentation graph (A2,R2).
Figure 3: Two possible cases for the argumentation graph of Agent Agb
The knowledge held by Aga can be expressed by the following formula of
25Note that the absence of an attack is expressed only if this attack is in the universe:
¬({a3} B {a2}) is in ΦU(A1,R1) since a3 attacks a2 in U, whereas ¬({a2} B {a1}) is not
in ΦU(A1,R1) since a2 does not attack a1 in U.
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YALLAU:26
ϕ = on({a0, a1, a2, a4}) ∧
¬(on({a3})) ∧ ¬(on({a5})) ∧ ¬(on({a6})) ∧
({a4} B {a1}) ∧ ({a1} B {a0}) ∧
¬({a0} B {a1}) ∧ ¬({a3} B {a2}) ∧ ¬({a5} B {a4}) ∧
¬({a6} B {a1}) ∧( (on({a7}) ∧ ({a7} B {a4}) ∧ ({a2} B {a1})) )
∨
(¬(on({a7})) ∧ ¬({a7} B {a4}) ∧ ¬({a2} B {a1}))
ϕ has only two models which are exactly the argumentation graphs (A1,R1)
and (A2,R2).
Note that ϕ ≡ ΦU(A1,R1) ∨ ΦU(A2,R2).
4.3 Encoding argumentation semantics
Since we want to use YALLAU for encoding argumentation semantics, some
formulae will be found very often, we propose useful notations for them.
Definition 15. Let t1 and t2 be terms of YALLAU. We define:
t1 = t2
def≡ (t1 ⊆ t2) ∧ (t2 ⊆ t1).
t1 6= t2 def≡ ¬(t1 = t2).
singl(t1)
def≡ (t1 6= c⊥) ∧ ∀t2 (((t2 6= c⊥) ∧ (t2 ⊆ t1)) =⇒ (t1 ⊆ t2)).
Obviously, (A,R) |= singl(t) if and only if the term t is interpreted by
a singleton of A.
The next step is to provide formulae that express the criteria underlying
the traditional argumentation semantics. Traditional semantics are defined
by lists of criteria, based on notions such as conflict-freeness, defense, admis-
sibility for instance. In the following, we encode these notions by appropriate
formulae of YALLAU.
26It would be possible to find a simpler and logically equivalent formula. Nevertheless,
we keep this formulation since it seems more natural and closer to an automatic translation
of the graph.
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Proposition 8. Let AU be a set of arguments and (A,R) be an argumen-
tation graph such that A ⊆ AU and R ⊆ A × A. Let t, t1, t2, t3 be terms
of YALLAU. We have:
• t is conflict-free in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= on(t) ∧ (¬(t B t)).
The latter formula is denoted by F (t).
• t1 defends each element of t2 in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (∀t3
((singl(t3)∧ (t3 B t2)) =⇒ (t1 B t3))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
t1 BB t2.
• If (A,R) |= singl(t2), then t1 indirectly defends the unique element of
t2 in (A,R) (which is denoted by (A,R) |= t1 B~~B t2) if and only if
(A,R) |= (t1 BB t2) ∨ (∃y ((t1 BB y) ∧ (y B~~B t2))).
• t is admissible in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (F (t) ∧ (t BB t)),
which is denoted by (A,R) |= A(t).
• t is a complete extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (A(t) ∧
∀t2 ((singl(t2) ∧ (t BB t2)) =⇒ (t2 ⊆ t))), which is denoted by
(A,R) |= C(t).
• t is the grounded extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (C(t) ∧
∀t2 (C(t2) =⇒ (t ⊆ t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |= G(t).
• t is a stable extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (F (t) ∧ ∀t2
((singl(t2) ∧ ¬(t2 ⊆ t)) =⇒ (t B t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
S(t).
• t is a preferred extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (A(t) ∧
∀t2 (((t2 6= t)∧ (t ⊆ t2)) =⇒ ¬A(t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
P (t).
Now, using YALLAU, we apply belief update concepts to argumentation.
5 Belief update and argumentation
We have seen in Section 3 that a change operation in argumentation is close
to a transition in belief change: an argumentation graph corresponds to a
state of the world and an executable operation to an authorized transition.
In this section, we propose an update operator and a set of properties specific
to change in abstract argumentation.
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Note that the belief update framework is defined for a propositional logic,
whereas YALLAU is a first-order language. Nevertheless, as the universe
(AU, RU) is finite, each structure that interprets formulae of YALLAU has
a finite domain, so each formula of YALLAU is equivalent to a propositional
combination of variable-free atomic formulae, using only the logical connec-
tives. In the following, quantifiers are kept for the sake of shortness of the
notations.
First, we recall some notions and definitions.
• The set of argumentation graphs built on the universe (AU,RU) is
denoted by ΓU.
• Moreover, for any formula ϕ of YALLAU, we denote by [ϕ] the set
of models of ϕ, i.e. the set of argumentation graphs such that ϕ is
true in these graphs (see Definition 11). Hence, [ϕ] can be written as
{G ∈ ΓU | G |= ϕ}.
• [ΦU(G)] = {G}, where ΦU(G) is the characteristic formula of the ar-
gumentation graph G (see Proposition 7).
• Finally, ϕ |= ψ means ∀G ∈ ΓU, if G |= ϕ then G |= ψ, or equivalently
[ϕ] ⊆ [ψ].
5.1 Classical belief update in abstract argumentation
Classical belief update (à la Katsuno-Mendelzon) in an argumentation frame-
work amounts to consider:
• a formula ϕ in YALLAU representing a current state of knowledge
about exchanged arguments (i.e., it may encompass several possible
argumentation systems),
• and a new piece of information α stating that the debate has evolved
in such a way that α now holds (i.e., the current state of the debate
is inside a set of argumentation systems satisfying α).
Updating ϕ by α gives a formula ϕ  α that represents the set of argu-
mentation systems that corresponds to an evolution of the debate where a
change has been done imposing α. Using Theorem 1, we know that this for-
mula corresponds to some argumentation systems which can be computed
thanks to a faithful pre-order.
In the framework described in Section 2.3, an argumentation system
can only evolve by an allowed operation made by an agent (according to
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the agent’s own argumentation system and according to her target). This
means that some transitions are not allowed. So the update operator given
by Definition 7 is required for reasoning about change in this framework.
5.2 Belief update postulates adapted to our argumentation
framework
Let T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU representing a set of authorized transitions (for instance,
the set of authorized transitions can be defined as in Definition 4). Using
YALLAU, we can express a change respecting T :
Definition 16 (Change respecting T ). For any ϕ, ψ in YALLAU, a
change from a set of argumentation graphs satisfying ϕ to a set of argumen-
tation graphs satisfying ψ is respecting T , denoted by (ϕ,ψ) |= T , if and
only if ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀G ∈ [ϕ],∃G′ ∈ [ψ], (G,G′) ∈ T ).
In other words, the change is possible if there exists a change from each
graph of the first set (which must be non empty) to at least one graph of
the second set.
Now, we can define a generalized enforcement operator:
Definition 17 (Generalized enforcement operator related to T ).
A generalized enforcement operator ♦T related to T is a mapping from
YALLAU × YALLAU to YALLAU which associates with any formula ϕ and
any formula α a formula, denoted by ϕ♦T α, such that (ϕ,ϕ♦T α) |= T .
In other words, ϕ♦T α characterizes the argumentation graphs obtained
from argumentation graphs satisfying ϕ through a change respecting T . The
postulates27 defined in Section 3.2 allow us to write the following represen-
tation theorem concerning enforcement, namely, an enforcement operator
satisfying these postulates can be defined by means of the definition of a
family of preorders on argumentation graphs.
27Reminder of the postulates defined in Section 3.2:
E3: [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ iff (ϕ, α) |= T .
U4: [ϕ] = [ψ] and [α] = [β] =⇒ [ϕ♦T α] = [ψ ♦T β].
E5: if card([ϕ]) = 1, then (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β |= ϕ♦T (α ∧ β).
E8: if ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅) or ([ψ] 6= ∅ and [ψ♦T α] = ∅),
then [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅
else [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = [(ϕ♦T α) ∨ (ψ♦T α)].
U9: if card([ϕ]) = 1, then [(ϕ♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕ♦T (α ∧ β) |= (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β.
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Definition 18. Given T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU a set of authorized transitions, an
assignment respecting T is a function that associates with each G ∈ ΓU a
complete preorder G such that ∀G1,G2 ∈ ΓU if (G,G1) ∈ T and (G,G2) /∈ T
then G1 ≺G G2.
Theorem 3. Given T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU a set of authorized transitions, there
exists an operator ♦T satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 if and only if there
is an assignment respecting T such that ∀G ∈ ΓU,∀ϕ, α ∈ YALLAU,
(1) [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃G ∈ [ϕ] such that [ΦU(G)♦T α] = ∅
(2) [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
G∈[ϕ]
[ΦU(G)♦T α] otherwise
(3) [ΦU(G)♦T α] =
{
G1 ∈ ΓU
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
G1 ∈ [α] and
(G,G1) ∈ T and
(∀G2 ∈ [α] such that (G,G2) ∈ T ,G1 G G2)
}
Following this theorem, given G, α a formula of YALLAU, and an assign-
ment respecting T , the formula ΦU(G)♦T α characterizes the closest graphs
with regard to G in which α is satisfied and which are obtained from G
through a transition in T (where “closest with regard to G” means minimal
with regard to the order G defined by the assignment).
Note that the above theorem is only a representation theorem (it is the
“argumentation” version of Theorem 2). It does not provide a constructive
way to build an assignment respecting the transitions. Nevertheless this
result is significant in the sense that it justifies the use of a distance relation
for finding the results of an argumentation update, and it explains as in
Katsuno-Mendelzon Theorem that the computation of the closest argumen-
tation systems (in the sense of this distance) should be done on each argu-
mentation system representing the initial knowledge. Note also that Postu-
lates E3 to U9 are general enough to characterize any update expressed in a
logical language. Hence, they apply to argumentation dynamics in the case
where argumentation notions are expressed in a logical framework as, for
instance, YALLA. However, they do not give any specific insight about how
the particular concepts of argumentation behave in the presence of change.
In the next section, we show that characterizations may be considered as
properties that refine update operators in the context of argumentation.
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5.3 Characterizations as a way to specialize update opera-
tors for argumentation
The characterizations presented in Section 2.4 enable us to learn what prop-
erties hold on the target graph when one argument is either added or re-
moved. Thanks to YALLAU and considering an update operator ♦T that
minimizes the changes wrt to addition and removal of arguments, with T
being a set of authorized transitions for a given user (depending on its own
knowledge, i.e. its own argumentation graph), we are going to translate
the characterizations into update properties specific to the argumentation
domain. These properties will play the same role as the postulates in belief
change theory since they are going to constrain the update operators and
the associated family of pre-orders. However they are not called “postu-
lates” since they are proven results that are coming from the argumentation
domain.
The characterizations were obtained by the addition (resp. removal) of
a single argument. Therefore, if the “nearest” graphs of G are precisely
those obtained by doing only one elementary operation executable on G
(i.e. adding or removing one single argument with its interactions and doing
nothing else), then an update operator with an assignment complying with
this closeness relation will satisfy the conclusion of the characterization.
Note that formally the executability of the change depends on the operating
agent system (see Definition 4), but, in this section, in order to simplify the
notations we consider that the agent that acts on the target is fixed.
First, we are going to define the elementary transitions corresponding to
elementary operations executable by the agent.
Definition 19 (Executable elementary transition set). The set of ex-
ecutable elementary transitions, denoted Te, is defined by Te = T+ ∪ T−
where
T+ =
{
(G1,G2) ∈ ΓU×ΓU
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃z ∈ AU and Rz ⊆ RU such that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉
is an elementary operation executable by the
agent on G1 and G2 = o(G1)
}
is the set of transitions corresponding to an elementary executable addition,
and
T− =
{
(G1,G2) ∈ ΓU×ΓU
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃z ∈ AU such that o = 〈	, z,∅〉 is an elementary
operation executable by the agent on G1 and
G2 = o(G1)
}
is the set of transitions corresponding to an elementary executable suppres-
sion.
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The proposition below is a kind of “argumentation update property
builder”, since for every result already established by a characterization we
can build an associated generalized enforcement property provided that the
chosen operator always prefers elementary changes to more complex ones.
Proposition 9. Given a set of authorized transitions T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU such
that28 Te ⊆ T , for any characterization C of the form:
“If G |= γ1 and ∃z,Rz such that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable by
the agent on G and o(G) |= αz then o(G) |= γ2”,
it holds that every assignment respecting T and Te allows us to define
a generalized enforcement operator ♦T in the same way as in Theorem 3
satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 and the additional property
AC : ∀A ⊆ AU,∀RA ⊆ A×A, ∀z ∈ AU \ A,
∀Rz ⊆ ({z} × A) ∪ (A× {z}),
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉,
if ΦU(G) |= γ1 and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(o(G)) |= αz
then ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= γ2.
where ϕRz =
∧
(x,y)∈Rz
(x B y) ∧
∧
x∈G|(x,z)6∈Rz
¬(x B z) ∧
∧
y∈G|(z,y)6∈Rz
¬(z B
y) is a formula that describes the attacks that are in Rz and that excludes
any other attack concerning z.
Remark 2. The additional property AC induces a new constraint on the
assignment: each pre-order of the assignment should be refined in order to
prefer elementary executable changes (in Te) in addition to the preferences
on transitions satisfying T . More precisely elementary changes should be
preferred to non elementary changes and among the non elementary changes
those in T are preferred to those outside of T .
Let us illustrate this “meta-proposition” with Characterization 1 given
in Section 2.4. Characterization 1 states that if p is the grounded extension
of (A,R), then all the graphs which are obtained from G by adding only z
28Te ⊆ T means that the elementary operations that are executable should be autho-
rized, i.e. included in the set of authorized transitions. Moreover, the inclusion of T into
ΓU × ΓU implies that RA ⊆ RU and Rz ⊆ RU. Note however that, since characteriza-
tions concern any argumentation graphs, this property would hold with any transition set
T that contains at least all the transitions that add or remove one argument.
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and attacks involving z, such that z does not attack G and p defends z, have
p ∪ {z} as grounded extension.
Using YALLAU, the sufficient conditions expressed in Characterization 1
can be encoded by the following formula related to two terms z and p de-
noting two subsets of AU:
Φ1z,p = (singl(z) ∧ (p BB z) ∧ ¬(∃t on(t) ∧ (z B t)))
Moreover, the assertion “the set p is the grounded extension of G” can be
expressed by ΦU(G) |= G(p) in YALLAU. Characterization 1 can be written
as follows: ∀p, if G |= G(p) and ∃z,Rz such that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable
by the agent on G and o(G) |= Φ1z,p then o(G) |= G(union(p, z)).
The corresponding update property is:
AC1: ∀A ⊆ AU, ∀RA ⊆ A×A,∀z ∈ AU \ A,
∀Rz ⊆ ({z} × A) ∪ (A× {z}),
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉,
∀p, if ΦU(G) |= G(p) and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(o(G)) |= Φ1z,p
then ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= G(union(p, z)).
Due to Proposition 9, an operator ♦T satisfies the property AC1 if ♦T
is defined as in Theorem 3 from an assignment such that the closest graphs
which are obtained from a graph G using a transition in T are exactly the
graphs obtained from G by executing an elementary executable addition.
Proposition 9 enables us to show a similar result concerning Character-
ization 2 which states that: if an operation adds an argument z, such that
z is not attacked and indirectly defends another argument x which was not
accepted under the grounded semantics, then x will become accepted under
the grounded semantics.
Let Φ2z,x = (singl(z) ∧ ¬(∃t on(t) ∧ (t B z)) ∧ (z B~~B x)).29 Characteri-
zation 2 can be written as follows: ∀x,∀p, if G |= G(p)∧ singl(x)∧¬(x ⊆ p)
and ∃z,Rz such that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable by the agent on G and
o(G) |= Φ2z,x then ∃p′ such that o(G) |= G(p′) ∧ (x ⊆ p′).
29Note that Φ2z,x |= on(x).
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The corresponding update property is:
AC2: ∀A ⊆ AU, ∀RA ⊆ A×A,∀z ∈ AU \ A,
∀Rz ⊆ ({z} × A) ∪ (A× {z}),
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉,
∀p, x, if ΦU(G) |= G(p) ∧ singl(x) ∧ ¬(x ⊆ p) and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and
ΦU(o(G)) |= Φ2z,x
then ∃p′,ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= G(p′) ∧ (x ⊆ p′).
Similarly, Characterization 4 given in Section 2.4 can be taken into ac-
count. This characterization states that if p is the grounded extension of G
then all the graphs which are obtained from G by adding only an argument
z and a set of attacks involving z, such that z does not attack p and p does
not defend z, have p as the grounded extension.
Let Φ4z,p = (singl(z) ∧ ¬(z B p) ∧ ¬(p BB z)). Characterization 4 can
be translated into YALLAU as follows: ∀p, if G |= G(p) and ∃z,Rz such
that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable by the agent on G and o(G) |= Φ4z,p then
o(G) |= G(p).
The above proposition allows us to deduce a new property for a gener-
alized enforcement operator, namely:
AC4: ∀A ⊆ AU, ∀RA ⊆ A×A,∀z ∈ AU \ A,
∀Rz ⊆ ({z} × A) ∪ (A× {z}),
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉,
∀p, if ΦU(G) |= G(p) and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(o(G)) |= Φ4z,p
then ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= G(p).
Below, we establish a proposition similar to Proposition 9 in the case of
removal.
Proposition 10. Given a set of authorized transitions T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU such
that Te ⊆ T , for any characterization C of the form:
“If G |= γ1 and ∃z such that o = 〈	, z,∅〉 is executable by the
agent on G and G |= αz then o(G) |= γ2”,
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it holds that every assignment respecting T and Te allows us to define
a generalized enforcement operator ♦T in the same way as in Theorem 3
satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 and the additional property
AC : ∀A ⊆ AU,∀RA ⊆ A×A, ∀z ∈ A,
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈	, z,∅〉,
if ΦU(G) |= γ1 and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(G) |= αz
then ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z) |= γ2
Remark 3. Note that while Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 seem alike,
they reflect the difference between the operations of addition and removal of
an argument. Thus, the additional property is different in these propositions,
which is due in particular to the set of attacks to consider in case of addition.
Another difference between Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 is the fact that
αz is not satisfied by the same graph (ΦU(o(G)) |= αz in Proposition 9 and
ΦU(G) |= αz in Proposition 10).
An example of update property obtained from a removal characterization
is the one corresponding to Characterization 3 given in Section 2.4 saying
that if an operation removes an argument z such that z is attacked by at
least one argument of G and knowing that the extension was not empty
before the change, then the extension obtained after the change will not be
empty.
Let Φ3z = (singl(z) ∧ (∃t on(t) ∧ (t B z)). Characterization 3 can be
translated into YALLAU as follows: ∀p, If G |= G(p) ∧ ¬(p ⊆ c⊥) and ∃z
such that o = 〈	, z,∅〉 is executable by the agent on G and G |= Φ3z then
o(G) |= ∃p′, G(p′) ∧ ¬(p′ ⊆ c⊥).
The above proposition allows us to deduce a new property for a gener-
alized enforcement operator, namely:
AC3: ∀A ⊆ AU,∀RA ⊆ A×A, ∀z ∈ A,
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈	, z,∅〉,
∀p, if ΦU(G) |= G(p) ∧ ¬(p ⊆ c⊥) and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(G) |= Φ3z
then ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z) |= ∃p′, G(p′) ∧ ¬(p′ ⊆ c⊥).
In this way, all characterizations about elementary changes that had been
already established (see for instance [14]) can be written as properties of a
generalized enforcement operator. These properties hold for any operator
♦T preferring elementary changes (see examples in Section 6).
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Remark 4. Note that these additional properties are not designed specif-
ically for computing the minimal operations to do in order to achieve a
given goal but they are properties that are specific for argumentation up-
date operators and that can be used to establish properties about elementary
changes. However, even if they were not designed to this end, the charac-
terizations have been used in a tool that computes the operations satisfying
a goal (see [16]).
5.4 Particular cases of generalized enforcement operators
A first idea is to define an operator that minimizes the changes in terms of
removal or addition of arguments in the target graph. It corresponds to an
operator that minimizes the Hamming distance between the worlds wrt the
predicate on. The operator ♦on is the operator associated to the assignment
that gives the preorders onG such that
G1 onG G2 iff diston(G,G1) ≤ diston(G,G2)
where
diston(G,G′) = card(
{
x ∈ AU
∣∣∣∣∣ G |= on(x) and G′ |= ¬on(x),or G |= ¬on(x) and G′ |= on(x)
}
)
Proposition 11. ♦on satisfies all the update properties.
A second idea is to define an operator that minimizes the changes on the
attacks.
As in the previous paragraph, we can define the operator ♦att based on
the distance distatt defined by:
distatt(G,G′) = card
{
(x, y) ∈ AU ×AU
∣∣∣∣∣ G |= att(x, y) and G′ |= ¬att(x, y),or G |= ¬att(x, y) and G′ |= att(x, y)
}
with att(x, y) ≡ singl(x) ∧ singl(y) ∧ (x B y) is a shortcut for expressing
that the argument x attacks the argument y.
Note that it is a generalized enforcement operator but some characteri-
zation properties may not hold for this operator since the assignment of att
is not necessarily preferring elementary changes. This kind of enforcement
operator has been used by Baumann [8, 7] with a restricted set of autho-
rized transitions (in Section 7 we show that Baumann’s normal enforcement
operator is a particular update operator).
43
Other examples of generalized enforcement operators can be defined on
preference relations that take into account preferences on arguments to re-
move/add or relations that prefer addition wrt to removal; moreover instead
of counting the number of attacks or arguments that differ it is possible to
define an operator based on set-inclusion. Another operator ♦dist could be
defined on the basis of distances between graphs taking into account the
different status that each argument has in each graph. In that case, distG
would be based on dist(G,G1) which measures the number of arguments that
do not have the same status in G and G1 for a given semantics. This oper-
ator could represent the reluctance of an agent to change her mind about
arguments statuses. So the lawyer could consider that it is less problematic
to use many new arguments/attacks to ensure that the argument “Mr. X is
not guilty” is accepted, provided that the change on argument acceptance
is minimal.
In the next section, we give a practical example in which some generalized
enforcement operators are exemplified.
6 Trial example
In this section, we give an example of how YALLA can be used. More pre-
cisely, we consider the context of the previous examples, that is to say during
a trial; Figure 4 recalls the universe of arguments used by the participants.
We are considering the reasoning done by Mr. X while attending the trial
concerning his own sad case.
a5 a6 a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
Figure 4: Universe (AU,RU).
6.1 Prosecutor turn
First, we are interested in a turn of the prosecutor. The state of the debate
is described by the argumentation graph given by Figure 5.
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a4 a1 a0
Figure 5: System representing the debate GD.
Formula representing the debate Thanks to YALLAU and following
Definition 14, we are able to represent the debate graph with regard to the
universe.
ϕ = on({a0, a1, a4}) ∧ ¬(on({a2}) ∧ ¬(on({a3}) ∧
¬(on({a5}) ∧ ¬(on({a6}) ∧ ¬(on({a7})
({a4} B {a1}) ∧ ({a1} B {a0}) ∧
¬({a0} B {a1}) ∧ ¬({a3} B {a2}) ∧ ¬({a2} B {a1}) ∧
¬({a5} B {a4}) ∧ ¬({a6} B {a1}) ∧ ¬({a7} B {a4})
Note that ϕ is exactly ΦU(GD).
Authorized transitions for the prosecutor As any agent, the prose-
cutor is not allowed to object against arguments that have not been uttered
and she is not able to add arguments that she does not know. Moreover, the
judge has allowed very short interventions for each participant. Hence, the
prosecutor can only use operations that correspond to the set of transitions
denoted Te in Definition 19.
Assignment of Mr. X about the prosecutor Mr. X thinks that the
addition of an argument is as plausible as its removal. So he uses an assign-
ment respecting Te but with no other refinement.
Mr. X’s knowledge about the prosecutor’s argumentation graph is given
by Figure 6.
a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
Figure 6: System of the prosecutor GPro.
Thanks to Mr. X’s assignment, we are able to represent the more plau-
sible graphs that can be reached after the prosecutor intervention. Table 1
shows these graphs ranked by plausibility.
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(	, a0,∅)(GD) (	, a1,∅)(GD)
(	, a4,∅)(GD) (⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD)
(⊕, a7, {(a7, a4)})(GD)
(	, a2,∅)(GD) (	, a7,∅)(GD)
(⊕, a4, {(a4, a1)})(GD) (⊕, a5, {(a5, a4)})(GD)
(⊕, {a2, a7}, {(a2, a1), (a7, a4)})(GD) (⊕, {a5, a7}, {(a5, a4), (a7, a4)})(GD)
· · ·
Table 1: The most plausible reachable graphs after the prosecutor intervention are
in the first layer, the least plausible ones (that are also the graphs to which the
transitions are not authorized) are in the second layer.
Goal of the prosecutor and update The prosecutor wants to make
accepted the argument representing the guilt of the defendant; her goal is
∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a1} ⊆ p). Hence, Mr. X may want to know what would be the
state of the debate if the prosecutor utters something, and Mr. X perfectly
knows that whatever the prosecutor may say, this would be said in a way to
achieve her goal. It means that Mr. X wants to compute the set of graphs
that satisfy the prosecutor’s goal and that are accessible from GD by a most
plausible elementary change:
[ΦU(GD)♦Te (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a1} ⊆ p))]
If we compute the extensions of the most preferred graphs of Table 1 we
can find two transitions that achieve the goal: (	, a4,∅) and (⊕, a7, {(a7, a4)}).
In order to avoid the computation of the extensions of each graph, Mr. X
may just want to check if the prosecutor would have had some interest to
add a particular argument, for instance a7. Hence, Mr. X wants to compute
the set of graphs containing a7 and the attack (a7, a4) that are accessible
from GD by a most plausible change:
[ΦU(GD)♦Te (on({a7}) ∧ ({a7} B {a4}))]
Using update property AC2 with z = {a7}, Rz = {(a7, a4)}, x = {a1}
and p = {a0, a4}, and knowing that the following properties hold:
• ΦU(GD) |= G(p) ∧ singl({a1}) ∧ ¬({a1} ⊆ p),
• (GD, 〈⊕, a7, {(a7, a4)}〉(GD)) ∈ Te and
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• ΦU(〈⊕, a7, {(a7, a4)}〉(GD)) |= singl({a7})∧¬(∃t(on(t)∧(t B {a7})))∧
({a7}B~~B {a1})),
we obtain:
∃p′,ΦU(GD)♦Te (on({a7}) ∧ ({a7} B {a4})) |= G(p′) ∧ ({a1} ⊆ p′)
Then, it is not necessary to compute the grounded extension of the graph
with the addition of a7 since, thanks to Property AC2, we are sure that a1
will be in the extension after the change.
6.2 Lawyer turn
After quite a heated duel between the two opponents that gave rise to several
new arguments, it is again the turn of the lawyer. Mr. X is sure that
Arguments a3 and a7 have been enunciated, and consequently he added
them to his representation of the current state of the debate, but he is not
so sure that Argument a2 has really been expressed clearly. As a result, he
hesitates between the two argumentation graphs presented in Figure 7 for
representing the current state of the debate.
a3
a7 a4 a1 a0
(a) Argumentation graph GD1.
a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
(b) Argumentation graph GD2.
Figure 7: Two possible cases for the debate according to Mr. X.
Formula representing the debate The doubt of Mr. X about the pres-
ence of a2 can be represented in YALLAU by:
ϕ = on({a0, a1, a3, a4, a7}) ∧
¬(on({a5})) ∧ ¬(on({a6})) ∧
({a1} B {a0}) ∧ ({a4} B {a1}) ∧ ({a7} B {a4}) ∧
¬({a0} B {a1}) ∧ ¬({a5} B {a4}) ∧ ¬({a6} B {a1}) ∧( (¬(on({a2})) ∧ ¬({a2} B {a1}) ∧ ¬({a3} B {a2})) )
∨
(on({a2}) ∧ ({a2} B {a1}) ∧ ({a3} B {a2}))
Note that ϕ ≡ (ΦU(GD1) ∨ ΦU(GD2)).
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Assignment of Mr. X about the lawyer Mr. X thinks that the lawyer
prefers addition over removal and elementary changes over non elementary
changes; hence, for the lawyer he uses the following assignment:
∀G ∈ ΓU,∀Gi ∈ ΓU, ∀Gk ∈ ΓU \ G,
• if (G,Gi) ∈ T+ and (G,Gk) ∈ T−, then Gi ≺LawG Gk
• else, if (G,Gi) ∈ Te and (G,Gk) /∈ Te, then Gi ≺LawG Gk.
Moreover Mr. X thinks that the system presented in Figure 8 is the
lawyer’s system.30
a5 a6 a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
Figure 8: System of the lawyer GLaw.
According to Mr. X’s assignment for the lawyer, the most plausible
graphs reachable after the lawyer intervention can be represented in Ta-
ble 2.
(⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD1) (⊕, a2, {(a2, a1), (a3, a2)})(GD1)
(⊕, a5, {(a5, a4)})(G) (⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(G)
(	, a0,∅)(G) (	, a1,∅)(G)
(	, a3,∅)(G) (	, a4,∅)(G)
(	, a7,∅)(G)
(⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD2) (⊕, a2, {(a2, a1), (a3, a2)})(GD2)
(	, a2,∅)(G) (	, a5,∅)(G)
(⊕, a4, {(a4, a1)})(G) (⊕, {a2, a6}, {(a2, a1), (a6, a1)})(G)
(	, {a3, a4},∅)(G) · · ·
Table 2: Most plausible graphs reachable after the lawyer intervention, in descend-
ing order (the first layer gathers the most preferred graphs, the second layer concerns
less preferred graphs and the third one concerns graphs that are not accessible by
an authorized transition). Note that G ∈ {GD1,GD2}.
30Here, at this moment, the lawyer graph is the universe. This means that the lawyer
knows all the arguments of this case.
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Goal of the lawyer and update Mr. X knows that the lawyer wants
to make accepted the argument representing his innocence; her goal is
∃p,G(p)∧ ({a0} ⊆ p) and Mr. X would like to compute what would happen
after his lawyer’s intervention (without knowing exactly what she is going to
say but knowing perfectly that his lawyer is brillant and would do anything
to prove his innocence):
[ϕ♦Te (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a0} ⊆ p))]
Note that since ϕ represents two argumentation graphs, we can use Pos-
tulate E8; we obtain:
[ΦU(GD1)♦Te (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a0} ⊆ p))] =
{
(⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD1),
(⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD1)
}
[ΦU(GD2)♦Te (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a0} ⊆ p))] =
{
(⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD2)
}
Hence,
[ϕ♦Te (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a0} ⊆ p))] =

(⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD1),
(⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD1),
(⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD2)

Figure 9 shows the result of the update of ϕ by (∃p,G(p) ∧ ({a0} ⊆ p))
in terms of graphs.
Moreover, as done during the turn of the prosecutor, Mr. X may again
avoid the computation of the extensions and can just check if the addition
of a6 is relevant for his lawyer’s goal.
Using Property AC2 with z = {a6}, Rz = {(a6, a1)}, x = {a0} and
p = {a1, a3, a7}, we obtain:
∃p′, ϕ♦Te (on(a6) ∧ (a6 B a1)) |= G(p′) ∧ (a0 ⊆ p′)
Here again, it is not necessary to compute the extension of the graph
with the addition of a6 since we know that a0 will be in the extension after
the change, thanks to AC2.
7 Related work
In this section, we review related works that either address the enforcement
issue, or address change in argumentation within a logical setting.
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a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
(a) Argumentation graph
(⊕, a2, {(a2, a1)})(GD1).
a6 a3
a7 a4 a1 a0
(b) Argumentation graph
(⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD1).
a6 a3 a2
a7 a4 a1 a0
(c) Argumentation graph (⊕, a6, {(a6, a1)})(GD2).
Figure 9: The three possible graphs obtained after the update.
Enforcement/update The main references about the particular goal of
enforcement are [8] and [7], where change operations are restricted to the
addition of new arguments and new attacks. More precisely, [7] introduces
three types of changes called “expansions”:
• the normal expansion adds new arguments and new attacks concerning
at least one of the new arguments,
• the weak expansion refines the normal expansion by the addition of
new arguments not attacking any old argument and
• the strong expansion refines the normal expansion by the addition of
new arguments not being attacked by any old argument.
The authors showed that it is not the case in general that any desired set
of arguments is enforceable using a particular expansion and that in some
cases, several enforcements are possible, some of them requiring more effort
than others. Baumann [7] has specified necessary and sufficient conditions,
called “characteristics” under which enforcements are possible.
More precisely, a characteristic of a set of arguments is defined wrt a
semantics and a set of possible expansions, as the minimal number of mod-
ifications (in terms of differences between attacks) that are needed in order
to enforce this set of arguments. This number equals 0 when each argument
of the desired set is already accepted. It equals infinity if no enforcement is
possible. [7] provides means to compute a characteristic w.r.t. a given type
of expansion and a given semantics. The characteristic of a set of arguments
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can be viewed as an evaluation of the change required to accept this set of
arguments. Thanks to Theorem 3, we can translate the fact that the char-
acteristic of a set of arguments E w.r.t. an argumentation graph G under
the grounded semantics (for instance) is c by the following expression:
G′ ∈ [ΦU(G) ♦att (E ⊆ p) ∧G(p)] implies that distatt(G,G′) = c
where ♦att is an update operator based on a preference ordering that mini-
mizes distatt with distatt being the number of attacks that are modified (see
Section 5.4), ΦU(G) is a formula describing the graph G and G(p) means
that the set p is the grounded extension (see Section 4). The previous ex-
pression means that in order to enforce E to be in the grounded extension,
an update operation will lead to an argumentation graph that has c attacks
that are changed wrt the initial argumentation graph. These characteristics
are related to our characterizations since the latter are necessary or sufficient
conditions for obtaining a given change property. However our character-
izations are expressed in a more general setting in which the authorized
transitions are not limited to Baumann’s expansions and the goals are not
restricted to enforcement.
Moreover, among the different kinds of changes proposed by Baumann,
the normal expansion, i.e., adding an argument with the attacks that con-
cern it, can be easily encoded by a particular update operator ♦TBatt :
L ×L → L with TB = {((A1,R1), (A2,R2)) | A1 ⊂ A2,R1 ⊆ R2,R2 \
R1 ∩ (A1 ×A1) = ∅}
Let us notice that in Baumann’s framework, the initial argumentation
graph should be completely known, i.e., the formula that describes it should
correspond to only one graph. And the formula concerning the goal of
enforcement should describe a set of arguments that should be accepted
(under a given semantics) after the change, such as G(p) for instance under
the grounded semantics.31
The idea of enforcement can be found in the approach of Moguillansky et
al. [44] through the concepts of activation and de-activation of arguments.
The idea is to make arguments rejected in order to activate (make accepted)
a given argument. Here the authors consider that they are facing a revision
problem but neither representation theorems nor characterization postu-
lates are given; the process of change is considered from the argumentation
31Note that since Baumann’s enforcement is defined on one graph and not on a set of
graphs, it is also a kind of belief revision since revision and update collapse when the initial
world is completely known (this kind of belief revision won’t be a pure AGM revision but
rather a revision under transition constraints).
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standpoint while keeping usual principles of belief revision, namely minimal
change and success. The change machinery first involves the determination
of attacking lines (sequences of arguments, where each argument attacks its
predecessor) that prevent a given argument from being accepted, then the
addition of new arguments so that the attacking lines are no more effective.
The choice of the argument to attack in a given attacking line is based on
the minimal change principle: the set of arguments of the line whose status
is modified should be as small as possible.
Booth et al. [21] propose to represent the belief state of an agent by an
argumentation graph and a constraint that encodes the outcome the agent
believes the graph should have. This belief state can be changed in two
ways: either by “strengthening” the constraint (more precisely, it amounts
to add a restriction to the logical formula that describes the constraint), or
by adding new arguments and/or attacks. However, it may happen that
a change makes the new constraint and the outcome inconsistent. In that
case, one solution proposed by [21] is to come up with an expansion of
the argumentation graph that restores coherence. This issue of restoring
coherence is related to the enforcement issue. Coste-Marquis et al. [26]
define new enforcement operators for which enforcement can be achieved
by adding arguments and attacks and also by questioning some attacks.
They propose a boolean encoding for the new enforcement problems, which
enables to formalize them as optimization problems.
Other works address dynamics in argumentation graphs using logical
languages.
Logical languages [21] uses a logical labeling language for representing
the constraints and the outcome of a graph. Formulae in this language are
statements about the acceptance status of arguments. These formulae are
interpreted on labelings, functions that assign to each argument of a graph a
label in, out or undecided. In contrast, formulae in YALLA are interpreted
on sets of argumentation graphs and may express the criteria underlying the
traditional extension-based semantics as well as a wide range of properties
that hold for some argumentation graphs. For instance, YALLA enables us
to express in a same formula that a given set of arguments should be ac-
cepted under the complete semantics but not accepted under the preferred
semantics. YALLA is a very expressive language capable of describing ab-
stract argumentation, structural semantics (i.e. semantics based on the
attack relation) and also change in argumentation systems.
Doutre et al. [29] encode argumentation frameworks and their dynamics
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in DL-PA, the Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments. More precisely,
to every input formula representing a goal to be enforced is associated a
DL-PA program implementing the corresponding update. Enforcement op-
erators are defined, which map an argumentation graph and a goal to a set
of argumentation graphs. Three postulates are given, namely a success pos-
tulate, a minimal change postulate and a postulate of syntax independence.
Note that, as in Baumann’s approach [7], an enforcement operator applies to
only one argumentation graph, which corresponds in our work to a formula
with only one model.
Moreover, our formalism handles a richer set of change operations which
are captured through the notion of update with transition constraints. An-
other difference lies in the additional properties that we have established on
the basis of the characterizations proposed by Bisquert et al. in [14] that
are specific for update of argumentation graphs.
Coste et al. [24] consider revision of an argumentation graph as mini-
mal change of the argument status. More precisely, given an argumentation
graph and a given semantics, a revision formula expresses how the status of
some arguments has to be changed. Then the revision process derives argu-
mentation graphs that satisfy the revision formula, while having extensions
as close as possible to the extensions of the input graph. Revision formulae
are expressed in a logical propositional language, where the propositional
variables are the arguments. A typical example of goal that can be encoded
is “Argument a must be accepted and Arguments b and c must be both
accepted or both refused”.
Revision operators are defined in a two-step process. The first step selects
from sets of arguments that satisfy the revision formula those as close as
possible to the extensions of the input graph, called candidates. The second
step generates the argumentation graphs whose extensions coincide with the
candidates, this is done by building argumentation graphs with the same ar-
guments as the initial graph and with attacks that are chosen in order to
coincide with the candidates. Note that the addition of arguments is not al-
lowed in the revision process. Moreover, the logical language cannot encode
complex goals, nor the argumentation semantics.
Coste et al. [25] propose a translation-based approach for revising argu-
mentation systems which is closer to our approach. They propose to encode
an argumentation framework into two kinds of logical constraints: those
concerning the structure of the argumentation framework and those con-
cerning the acceptance of arguments wrt a given semantics. This logical
encoding allows the use of classical revision operators to perform a ratio-
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nal minimal change. Let us first note that the choice of revising instead
of updating is not justified by these authors. Another difference with our
approach concerns the logical encoding. Coste et al. [25] use a propositional
language allowing the representation of attacks between arguments (the at-
tack between arguments x and y is represented by the variable att(x, y)) and
of skeptical acceptance (the variable acc(x) represents the skeptical accep-
tance of Argument x). Each semantics is encoded by a logical formula which
expresses for each argument the condition under which it is skeptically ac-
cepted under this semantics. In contrast, YALLA is a first-order language
with more expressivity. YALLA enables to encode sets of arguments, set-
theoretic properties and attacks between sets of arguments. YALLA enables
to reason about extensions, and not only about argument acceptance: for
each semantics, there is a formula in YALLA expressing that a subset of
arguments is an extension under this semantics.
Diller et al. [28] study revision operators that produce a single argumen-
tation framework as output, still using a minimal change principle on the
extensions. This differs from [25] in which a set of argumentation frame-
works was obtained. More precisely, [28] proposes two revision operators
according to the representation of the new information which can be either
1) a propositional formula expressing the desired change in the extensions
of the original system, or 2) a new argumentation system. Thanks to our
first-order language YALLA the two kinds of revision that are proposed
can be captured in our formalism. Moreover since there is no uncertainty
about the initial system, revision and update collapse hence our framework
is a generalization of [28] in which it is imposed that the resulting formula
should only have one model.
Some other works provide a logical analysis of argumentation.
Villata et al. [54] propose a logical formalism for representing (and rea-
soning about) the extensions of traditional semantics. This work follows
work of Besnard and Doutre [10]. The arguments of an argumentation graph
are denoted by symbols of the language enabling the user to write formulae
whose models are sets of arguments. However, the purpose of this work is to
characterize the extensions, in particular, it is not possible to write formulae
that relate the structure of an argumentation graph and its extensions.
A language with a similar expressivity has been proposed by Coste-
Marquis et al. [27], with another purpose. The idea was to generalize Dung’s
formal framework [31] by taking into account additional constraints (ex-
pressed in a logical form) about the admissible sets of arguments.
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A logical language was also proposed by Wooldridge et al. [58] in which
it is possible to express acceptability, conflicts and defense between sets of
arguments. However, this formalism is devoted to specific kinds of argu-
ments namely logical arguments (i.e., pairs (support, conclusion) where the
support is a set of formulae that infers logically the formula constituting the
conclusion).
Those works are related to our YALLA proposal since these languages
enable also to describe and reason about argumentation graphs; however
none of them enables the user to express structural properties of an abstract
argumentation graph together with its semantic properties (which is the
main purpose of YALLA).
8 Conclusion
This article proposes a complete framework for handling the dynamics of an
abstract argumentation graph. Our first aim was to define a frame in which
it is possible to represent several knowledge bases under the form of several
argumentation graphs. More precisely, in our formalism, it is possible to
express (and study) how an agent who has her own argumentation graph
can interact on a target argumentation graph (that may represent a state of
knowledge at a given stage of a debate). The two argumentation graphs are
defined inside a referential argumentation graph called the universe (which
constitutes a kind of “common language”).
An important issue about knowledge dynamics is the establishment of
a set of axioms that characterize rational changes. Hence it was impor-
tant to situate our framework in the field of belief change theory. We first
generalized classical update postulates in order to take into account a set
of authorized transitions. Since the update approach is based on classical
propositional logic, we have defined a logical language (called YALLA) for
representing argumentation graphs. Then we have shown that the change
operations on argumentation graphs are update operations. This discovery
is very important since many works about enforcement (e.g. [44, 25, 28])
are only considering revision which we think inappropriate for reasoning in
a public debate context. Since we are facing an update process we have
been able to show that it guarantees the existence of a preference relation
on transitions between argumentation systems. Hence it justifies the idea
that it is rational to compute minimal change operations, or optimal plan.
Moreover due to previous works about dynamics in argumentation we have
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been in position to provide a set of new properties that are specific of argu-
mentation update. We have illustrated our framework on an example that
takes place in a judicial context with a prosecutor and a lawyer.
Another interest of our formal study is the definition of the language
YALLA. YALLA is a first order logical language able to express complex
information about an argumentation system, not only its structure but also
the relations between sets of arguments: e.g. attack/defense between sets
of arguments, inclusion, union of sets. This permits to express the prin-
ciples underlying the usual semantics (e.g. conflict-freeness, admissibility,
complement-attack, maximality), and so the extensions can be derived from
logical formulae. In the future YALLA will allow us to capture any defi-
nition of an acceptable set of arguments (e.g. semi-stable semantics . . . ).
Several similar logical languages that express the relation between the at-
tack relation and the extensions have been proposed in the recent years (see
Section 7), but as far as we know, none of them has the same expressiv-
ity than YALLA. Moreover providing a logic-based tool that characterizes
properties of evolving argumentation systems may enable us to use standard
logic-based solvers (for instance, automatic theorem provers or SMT-solvers)
in order to find new argumentation-based update properties.
In conclusion, the main result of this paper is a unified view of dynamics
in argumentation with the use of a new logical language and the discovery
of a set of properties specific for argumentation dynamics.
Many directions are opened and would be interesting to follow, we list
four possible trails below.
• In our definition of the operations that are executable on an argumen-
tation graph, we restrict to operations that really achieve a change,
i.e. it is not possible to add an argument that is already present or
to suppress an argument that is not there. This restriction is natural
but can lead to ignore some possible changes when the initial graph
is not completely known, since an operation could be excluded if it is
not executable in one of the possible initial situations. An idea would
be to relax the executability constraint in order to allow for adding ar-
guments already present or removing non existing arguments (in that
case the operation will have no effect).
• Concerning non elementary operations, it would be interesting to real-
ize a comparative analysis of the effect of performing a set of elemen-
tary operations in parallel (or simultaneously) wrt performing them in
sequence.
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• The planning aspect of change in argumentation system is a growing
area in the literature. From a strategical point of view, it would be
interesting to study if there is a way for one of the agents to reach
her goal on the target system whatever the future actions of the other
agents are. This kind of “long term” objective is important in many
debates where the agent does not necessarily want to “win” at the next
step but she wants to win at the end of the debate.
• A very appealing perspective is to study how a private argumenta-
tion graph evolves in presence of a public argumentation graph (in
which the operations can be viewed as public announcements [53]).
This is clearly related to belief revision and could also be situated wrt
approaches about fusion of argumentation graphs.
A Proofs
Proposition 1. U1 is implied by E3, E5 and E8.
Proof of Proposition 1. ∀ϕ, α ∈ L , if ∃ω′ ∈ [ϕ♦T α] then, due to E3,
(ϕ, α) |= T , i.e., [ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀ω ∈ [ϕ],∃ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω′) ∈ T .
Hence using E8, [ϕ♦T α] = ∪ω∈[ϕ][Φ(ω)♦T α]. Hence there is a ω ∈ [ϕ] such
that ω′ ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α]. Due to E5, (Φ(ω)♦T α)∧Φ(ω′) |= Φ(ω)♦T (α∧Φ(ω′)).
Hence ω′ ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ Φ(ω′))]. Due to E3, (Φ(ω), (α ∧ Φ(ω′)) |= T so
[α ∧ Φ(ω′)] 6= ∅. Hence ω′ ∈ [α]. Hence, U1 holds.
Proposition 2. E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 constitute a minimal set: no postu-
late can be derived from the others.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us recall the set of postulates: ∀ϕ,ψ, α, β ∈ L ,
E3: [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ if and only if (ϕ, α) |= T
U4: [ϕ] = [ψ] and [α] = [β] =⇒ [ϕ  α] = [ψ  β]
E5: If card([ϕ]) = 1 then (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β |= ϕ♦T (α ∧ β)
E8: if ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅) or ([ψ] 6= ∅ and [ψ♦T α] = ∅) then
[(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅ else [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = [(ϕ♦T α) ∨ (ψ♦T α)]
U9: If card([ϕ]) = 1 then if [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ then [(ϕ♦T α) ∧ β] 6=
∅ =⇒ ϕ♦T (α ∧ β) |= (ϕ♦T α) ∧ β
In order to prove this result we have to provide for each postulate an
operator satisfying the other postulates but not this one.
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Independency of E3: Let ♦T be such that ∀ϕ, α ∈ L , if (ϕ, α) 6|= T then
[ϕ♦T α] = [α] else [ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
E3 does not hold.
U4 holds: since we define ♦T only from the models of ϕ and α.
E5 holds: since if (Φ(ω), α) |= T then [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅, hence U5
holds, else [Φ(ω)♦T α] = [α] and (Φ(ω), α) 6|= T which implies
(Φ(ω), α ∧ β) 6|= T , hence [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ β)] = [α ∧ β] hence E5
holds.
E8 holds: If ϕ 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ then (ϕ, α) |= T , which implies
(ϕ ∨ ψ, α) |= T , hence [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅ (E8 holds). Else
(ϕ, α) 6|= T and (ψ, α) 6|= T , thus (ϕ ∨ ψ, α) 6|= T which means
[ϕ ∨ ψ♦T α] = [α] = [ϕ♦T α] = [ψ♦T α].
U9 holds: If [(ϕ♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ then it means that [(ϕ♦T α) 6= ∅
hence (ϕ, α) 6|= T , i.e., [(ϕ♦T α) = [α], so [(ϕ♦T α)∧β] = [α∧β].
Moreover, (ϕ, α) 6|= T implies (ϕ, α ∧ β) 6|= T . This means that
[ϕ♦T (α ∧ β)] = [α ∧ β].
Independency of U4: Given a formula α ∈ L and a world ω ∈ Ω, let us
denote by rω(α) the number of the first literal in α that holds in ω. Let
♦T be such that ∀ω ∈ Ω, [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T
and for any other world ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , rω2(α) ≥
rω1(α)}. And [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃ω ∈ [ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅
otherwise[ϕ♦T α] = ∪ω∈[ϕ][Φ(ω)♦T α].
E3 holds.
U4 does not hold: let us consider L based on A = {a, b} and
three worlds ω, ω1, ω2 such that Φ(ω1) = on(a) ∧ ¬on(b) and
Φ(ω2) = ¬on(a) ∧ on(b), let us suppose that T contains at least
the transitions (ω, ω1) and (ω, ω2). If we set α = Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2)
and β = Φ(ω2) ∨ Φ(ω1), then it leads to [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1} and
[Φ(ω)♦T β] = {ω2}.
E5 and U9 hold since the ordering of the literals is not changed in
the conjunction.
E8 holds by definition.
Independency of E5: Let ♦T be such that ∀ϕ, α ∈ L , ∃ω0 ∈ Ω such
that if (ϕ, α) |= T then [ϕ♦T α] = {ω0} else [ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
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E3 holds.
U4 holds.
E5 does not hold: since ∀ω1 ∈ Ω such that ω1 6= ω0 and ∀ω ∈ Ω
such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T , we have [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)] = {ω0}, hence
[(Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)) ∧Φ(ω0)] = {ω0}, while [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)∧Φ(ω0))] =
∅ (since [Φ(ω1)∧Φ(ω0)] = ∅, which implies that (Φ(ω),Φ(ω1)∧
Φ(ω)) 6|= T ).
E8 holds: If ϕ 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ then (ϕ, α) 6|= T , which implies
(ϕ ∨ ψ, α) 6|= T , hence [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = ∅ (E8 holds). Else
(ϕ, α) |= T and (ψ, α) |= T , thus (ϕ ∨ ψ, α) |= T which means
[ϕ ∨ ψ♦T α] = {ω0} = [ϕ♦T α] = [ψ♦T α].
U9 holds: If [(ϕ♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ then it means that [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅
hence (ϕ, α) |= T , i.e., [ϕ♦T α] = {ω0}. Hence ω0 ∈ [β], this
means that (ϕ, α ∧ β) |= T , hence [ϕ♦T (α ∧ β)] = {ω0}.
Independency of E8: Let ♦T be such that ∀ϕ, α ∈ L , ∃ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, such
that ω1 6= ω2 and if (ϕ, α) |= T and Card([ϕ]) = 1 then [ϕ♦T α] =
{ω1}, if (ϕ, α) |= T and Card([ϕ]) 6= 1, [ϕ♦T α] = {ω2}, otherwise
[ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
E3 holds.
U4 holds.
E5 holds: if ω1 ∈ [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β], then [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1} hence
ω1 ∈ [β] and (Φ(ω), α) |= T . Thus, (Φ(ω), α ∧ β) |= T hence
[Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ β)] = {ω1}. Hence the result.
E8 does not hold: the first part of E8may hold but when Card([ϕ]) =
Card([ψ]) = 1 and ϕ♦T α 6= ∅ and ψ♦T α 6= ∅ then we have
[(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α] = {ω2} while [ϕ♦T α] = [ψ♦T α] = {ω1}. Hence
E8 does not hold.
U9 holds: Same method as the one for U5.
Independency of U9: Let ♦T be such that ∀ϕ, α ∈ L , ∃ω0 ∈ Ω, if
(ϕ, α) |= T then (if [α] 6= Ω then [ϕ♦T α] = [α] else [ϕ♦T α] = {ω0})
otherwise [ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
E3 holds
U4 holds.
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E5 holds: if ω1 ∈ [(Φ(ω)♦T α)∧β] then if [α] 6= Ω then ω1 ∈ ([α]∩[β]).
Hence, [α ∧ β] 6= ∅ and [α ∧ β] 6= Ω, it means that [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧
β)] = [α∧β], hence E5 holds. Now, if [α] = Ω then [(Φ(ω)♦T α)∧
β] = {ω0} ∩ [β], this means that ω1 = ω0 and ω0 ∈ [β], hence
ω0 ∈ [α∧β]. Now, either [α∧β] = Ω and [Φ(ω)♦T (α∧β)] = {ω0},
or α ∧ β 6= Ω and [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ β)] = [α ∧ β]. In both cases, E5
holds.
E8 holds: the definition of♦T does not depend on the first parameter
(except for detecting failure) hence E8 holds (same kind of proof
as for E5 independency).
U9 does not hold: For instance let us consider ω1 ∈ Ω such that ω1 6=
ω0 and (ϕ,Φ(ω1)) |= T , we have [(ϕ♦T >)∧ (Φ(ω0)∨Φ(ω1))] 6= ∅
while [ϕ♦T (>∧(Φ(ω0)∨Φ(ω1))] = {ω0, ω1} 6⊂ [(ϕ♦T >)∧(Φ(ω0)∨
Φ(ω1)] = {ω0}.
Theorem 2. Given a set T ⊆ Ω× Ω of authorized transitions, there is an
operator ♦T : L ×L → L satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 if and only if
there is an assignment respecting T such that ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ϕ, α ∈ L ,
(1) [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃ω ∈ [ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅
(2) [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α] otherwise
(3) [Φ(ω)♦T α] =
{
ω1 ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω1 ∈ [α] and
(ω, ω1) ∈ T and
(∀ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2)
}
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is similar to the one done by Katsuno and
Mendelzon except that it does not rely on postulate U2, and uses the re-
stricted versions E3, E5 and E8. Moreover it takes into account the set
T . Note that this proof uses Proposition 4 which is defined later (but only
relies on E3). This proof is carried out in two steps.
Step 1: Let ♦T : L ×L → L be an operator satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8,
U9. For any ω ∈ Ω, let us define ω such that ω1 ω ω2 if and only
if ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] or [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] = ∅.
We can show that ω is a complete preorder. In the following we
abbreviate Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ωx) ∨ Φ(ωy) by ♦(x, y) and Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨
Φ(ω2) ∨ Φ(ω3)) by ♦(1, 2, 3)
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• Transitivity: Let us consider ω, ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ Ω, such that ω1 ω
ω2 and ω2 ω ω3, there are four cases:
– ω1 ∈ ♦(1, 2) and ω2 ∈ ♦(2, 3): due to Proposition 4, we get
♦(1, 2, 3) 6= ∅. Hence, due to U1, [♦(1, 2, 3)] ⊆ {ω1, ω2, ω3}.
∗ if [♦(1, 2, 3) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] = ∅ then [♦(1, 2, 3)] =
{ω3}, which means that [♦(1, 2, 3) ∧ (Φ(ω2) ∨ Φ(ω3))] 6=
∅, hence using both U9 and E5, ♦(1, 2, 3) ∧ (Φ(ω2) ∨
Φ(ω3)) = ♦(2, 3) this is in contradiction with the hy-
pothesis that ω2 ∈ ♦(2, 3).
∗ if [♦(1, 2, 3) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] 6= ∅ then using E5 and
U9, ♦(1, 2) = ♦(1, 2, 3)∧ [(Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ω2))]. Hence, ω1 ∈
♦(1, 2, 3). Due toE5 andU9 again, ♦(1, 3) = ♦(1, 2, 3)∧
[(Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω3))], hence ω1 ∈ ♦(1, 3).
– ♦(1, 2) = ∅ and ω2 ∈ ♦(2, 3): due to the converse of Propo-
sition 4, we get [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω2)] = ∅. Now, due to E5,
♦(2, 3) ∧ Φ(ω2) |= Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω2) hence ω2 6∈ ♦(2, 3), con-
tradiction: so this case never occurs.
– ω1 ∈ ♦(1, 2) and ♦(2, 3) = ∅, using Proposition 4, we get
that [♦(1, 2, 3)] 6= ∅, from U1, [♦(1, 2, 3)] ⊆ {ω1, ω2, ω3}.
Using E5 and U9, as previously we get that ω2 6∈ ♦(1, 2, 3)
and ω3 6∈ ♦(1, 2, 3). Hence, [♦(1, 2, 3) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))]
should contain ω1. Using E5 we get ω1 ∈ ♦(1, 3).
– ♦(1, 2) = ∅ and ♦(2, 3) = ∅, using Proposition 4, we get
that [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)] = ∅ and [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω3)] = ∅, using
E5 we get that ♦(1, 3) = ∅.
• Reflexivity: ∀ω, ω1 ∈ Ω, usingU1, Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1) |= Φ(ω1), hence
either ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)] or [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)] = ∅. Hence ω1 ω
ω1.
• Completeness: ∀ω, ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, if ω1 6 ω2 then [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨
Φ(ω2))] 6= ∅ and ω1 6∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))], due to U1 it
means that ω2 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))]. Hence ω2 ω ω1.
• ω respects T : if (ω, ω1) ∈ T and (ω, ω2) 6∈ T and ω2 ω ω1
it means that either [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] = ∅ or ω2 ∈
[Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))].
Due to E3, since (ω, ω1) ∈ T , [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)] 6= ∅.
Due to U1, ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)]. Hence using E5 and U9,
[Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2)) ∧ Φ(ω1)] = [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)] = {ω1}.
Contradiction, hence ω1 ≺ω ω2.
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Let us show now that ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀α ∈ L , [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1 ∈ [α] such
that (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α], such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2}.
• If ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α], due to U1, ω1 ∈ [α]. If ∃ω2 ∈ [α] such that
(ω, ω2) ∈ T and ω2 ≺ω ω1 , it means that ω1 6∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)∨
Φ(ω2))].
Due to E5, (Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2)) |= Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨
Φ(ω2)) which implies ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ω2))], hence ω1 ω
ω2. Moreover, due toE5, [(Φ(ω)♦T α)∧Φ(ω1)] ⊆ [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)],
hence ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω1)], hence (ω, ω1) ∈ T .
Thus [Φ(ω)♦T α] ⊆ {ω1 ∈ [α], (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α] such
that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2}.
• Conversely, let ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α]
such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2. Let us first consider ω2 ∈ [α]
such that (ω, ω2) 6∈ T , Due to E5: [(Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))) ∧
Φ(ω2)] ⊆ [Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω2)] and, since (ω, ω2) 6∈ T , due to E3,
[Φ(ω)♦T Φ(ω2)] = ∅. Moreover since (ω, ω1) ∈ T , we get us-
ing E3 that [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨Φ(ω2)] 6= ∅. Due to U1, [Φ(ω) 
(Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ω2))] ⊆ {ω1, ω2}. Hence, [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ω2))] =
{ω1} this result, say (a), holds for any ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) 6∈
T .
Furthermore, due to our hypothesis about ω1, ∀ω2 ∈ [α] such that
(ω, ω2) ∈ T , if [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ω2))] 6= ∅ then ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T
(Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))]. Let us call (b) this result.
Let us denote, without loss of generality, {ω1, . . . , ωn} = [α] the
set of worlds in which α holds (this set is finite since A is finite
and R is fixed).
Due to E3 and U1, since (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ω1 ∈ [α], we get
[(Φ(ω)♦T α)] 6= ∅ and [(Φ(ω)♦T α)] ⊆ [α] = {ω1, . . . , ωn}.
Hence, for some k ∈ [1, n], it holds that [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨
Φ(ωk))] 6= ∅. Let us notice that ∀i ∈ [2, n], [α∧(Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ωi)] =
[(Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ωi)]. Due to U4, we deduce that [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧
(Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ωi))] = [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ωi))]
By definition of k, we can apply both E5 andU9, we get [Φ(ω)♦T
(Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ωk))] = [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ωk))] 6= ∅.
If (ω, ωk) 6∈ T then due to (a) we get [((Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ (Φ(ω1) ∨
Φ(ωk))] = {ω1}. If (ω, ωk) ∈ T then due to (b) we get ω1 ∈
[((Φ(ω)♦T α)∧ (Φ(ω1)∨Φ(ωk))]. In both cases, ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α].
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Now, if [ϕ] = ∅ then ∪ω∈[ϕ][Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅. Else let us denote
ω1, . . . ωn the worlds in which ϕ holds: [ϕ] = [Φ(ω1)∨ . . .Φ(ωn)], using
E8, if ∃ω ∈ [ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅ then [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ else we
get that [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α]. Hence, the result.
Step 2: Let ω be a complete preorder on Ω× Ω respecting T , let ♦T be
defined by ∀ω ∈ Ω, [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T and
∀ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2} and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃ω ∈
[ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅. Otherwise [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α].
Let us show that ♦T satisfies E3, U4, E5, E8 and U9:
E3:
(⇒:) [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ if and only if [ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀ω ∈ [ϕ], [Φ(ω)♦T α] 6=
∅. This implies that (ϕ, α) |= T since it is equivalent to
[ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀ω ∈ [ϕ], ∃ω′ ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω′) ∈ T .
(⇐:) if (ϕ, α) |= T then [ϕ] 6= ∅ and ∀ω ∈ [ϕ], ∃ω′ ∈ [α] such that
(ω, ω′) ∈ T . Due to the completeness of ω it means that
∃ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω′ ∈ [α], ω1 ω ω′. By
definition it means that [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅.
U4: since the definition of ♦T is only based on the models of ϕ and
α, it is easy to check that U4 holds.
E5: if [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ then ∃ωa ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α] ∩ [β]. Thus,
ωa ∈ [β] and ωa ∈ [α] and (ω, ωa) ∈ T and ∀ω1 ∈ [α] such
that (ω, ω1) ∈ T , ωa ω ω1. Hence ∀ω2 ∈ [α ∧ β] such that
(ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω2 being in [α], it means that ωa ω ω2. Hence,
ωa ∈ [(Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ β)].
E8: by definition.
U9: if [(Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β] 6= ∅ then let ωb ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (α ∧ β)] then
ωb ∈ [α∧β] and (ω, ωb) ∈ T and ∀ω1 ∈ [α∧β] such that (ω, ω1) ∈
T , ωb ω ω1. Now let ωa ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β], it means that
ωa ∈ [α ∧ β] and (ω, ωa) ∈ T , hence ωb ω ωa. Moreover, by
definition of ωa, ∀ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T , ωa ω ω1.
Thus, by transitivity, ∀ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T , ωb ω ω1.
Thus, ωb ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α) ∧ β].
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Proposition 3. If ♦T satisfies E3, U4, E5, E8 and U9 then ([ϕ] = ∅ or
[α] = ∅) =⇒ [ϕ♦T α] = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is straightforward from the equation re-
lating ♦T and  in Theorem 2.
Proposition 4. If ♦T satisfies E3 then ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅) =⇒
(∀γ, [ϕ♦T (α ∨ γ)] 6= ∅).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let ϕ, α ∈ L such that [ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅
and ♦T satisfies E3. It means that (ϕ, α) |= T , i.e., ∀ω ∈ [ϕ], ∃ω1 ∈ [α],
(ω, ω1) ∈ T . Now, ∀β ∈ L , [α] ⊆ [α ∨ β], hence ω1 ∈ [α ∨ β]. This means
that (ϕ, α ∨ β) |= T . Using E3, we get [ϕ♦T (α ∨ β)] 6= ∅.
Proposition 5. Given a reflexive relation T ⊆ Ω×Ω of authorized transi-
tions, there is an operator ♦T : L ×L → L satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8,
U9 that satisfies U2 if and only if there is a faithful assignment respecting
T defined as in Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let T be a reflexive relation on Ω× Ω.
(a). Let ♦T : L ×L → L be an operator satisfying U2, E3, U4, E5, E8,
U9. For any ω ∈ Ω, let us define ω such that ω1 ω ω2 if and only
if ω1 ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] or [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω1) ∨ Φ(ω2))] = ∅.
Due to Theorem 2, ω is a complete preorder on Ω respecting T .
∀ω1 ∈ Ω, let us compute [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω) ∨ Φ(ω1))]. Due to U2, since
Φ(ω) |= Φ(ω) ∨ Φ(ω1), we have [Φ(ω)♦T (Φ(ω) ∨ Φ(ω1))] = [Φ(ω)].
Hence, ω ≺ω ω1. It means that the assignment is faithful.
(b). ∀ω ∈ Ω, let ω be a complete preorder on Ω × Ω respecting T , and
such that ∀ω1, ω ≺ω ω1. Let ♦T be defined by ∀ω ∈ Ω, [Φ(ω)♦T α] =
{ω1 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α], ω1 ω ω2} and
[ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃ω ∈ [ϕ] such that [Φ(ω)♦T α] = ∅. Otherwise
[ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α]. Due to Theorem 2, ♦T satisfies U1, E3,
U4, E5, E8 and U9. Let us check if U2 holds: let ϕ, α ∈ L , such
that ϕ |= α.
(a) If [ϕ] = ∅ then due to Proposition 3 [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ (hence U2
holds).
(b) If [ϕ] 6= ∅ then let ω ∈ [ϕ], [Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω1 ∈ [α] such that
(ω, ω1) ∈ T and ∀ω2 ∈ [α] such that (ω, ω2) ∈ T , ω1 ω ω2}.
64
Since ϕ |= α, it meant that ω |= α. Moreover since T is reflexive
then (ω, ω) ∈ T , lastly, due to faithfulness, ∀ω1, ω ≺ω ω1. Hence
ω ∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α] and ∀ω1 6= ω, ω1 6∈ [Φ(ω)♦T α]. It means that
[Φ(ω)♦T α] = {ω} = [Φ(ω)]. This is true for any ω ∈ [ϕ], hence⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)♦T α] =
⋃
ω∈[ϕ]
[Φ(ω)] = [ϕ] (hence U2 holds).
Proposition 6. If T = Ω×Ω then ♦T satisfies U2, E3, U4, E5, E8, U9
if and only if ♦T satisfies U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U8 and U9.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let T = Ω× Ω.
(a). Let ♦T be an operator satisfying U2, E3, U4, E5, E8, U9, let us
show that it satisfies U1, U3, U5 and U8:
U1: This is due to Proposition 1.
U3: If [ϕ] 6= ∅ then due to E3, [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ if and only if (ϕ, α) ∈ T .
Hence, T being equal to Ω × Ω, if [α] 6= ∅ then (ϕ, α) ∈ T thus
[ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅.
U5: This is due to U8 and E5.
U8: If [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ or [ψ♦T α] = ∅ then, due to E8, we have [(ϕ ∨
ψ)♦T α] = ∅, hence U8 holds. If [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ and [ψ♦T α] 6= ∅
then, due to E8, U8 holds.
(b). Let ♦T be an operator satisfying U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U8 and U9
let us show that it satisfies E3, E5 and E8:
E3: When T = Ω× Ω, (ϕ, α) ∈ T ⇔ [α] 6= ∅, hence the result.
E5: It is a particular case of U5.
E8: If ([ϕ] 6= ∅ and [ϕ♦T α] = ∅) then due to U3 it means that
[α] = ∅, hence, due to U1, [(ϕ ∨ ψ)♦T α = ∅. (E8 holds).
Now, if [ϕ] = ∅ and [α] 6= ∅ then, due to U3, [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅, idem
for ψ. It means that the other case is when [ϕ♦T α] 6= ∅ and
[ψ♦T α] 6= ∅ in that case U8 applies hence E8 holds.
Proposition 7. (A,R) is the unique model of ΦU(A,R).
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Proof of Proposition 7. Let G = (A,RA). Let G1 ∈ ΩA, G1 = (A1,RA1),
such that G1 ∈ [ΦU(G)]. Using Definitions 14, 13 and the axioms proposed
in Section 4.2.2, ∀x ∈ A, x ∈ G if and only if on(x) is true in G1. Hence, G1
has the same vertices as G, i.e. A1 = A. So RA1 = RA and G1 =G.
Proposition 8. Let AU be a set of arguments, and (A,R) an argumenta-
tion graph such that A ⊆ AU and R ⊆ A×A. Let t, t1, t2, t3 be terms of
YALLAU. We have:
• t is conflict-free in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= on(t) ∧ (¬(t B t)).
The latter formula is denoted by F (t).
• t1 defends each element of t2 in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (∀t3
((singl(t3)∧ (t3 B t2)) =⇒ (t1 B t3))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
t1 BB t2.
• If (A,R) |= singl(t2), then t1 indirectly defends the unique element of
t2 in (A,R) (which is denoted by (A,R) |= t1 B~~B t2) if and only if
(A,R) |= (t1 BB t2) ∨ (∃y ((t1 BB y) ∧ (y B~~B t2))).
• t is admissible in (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (F (t) ∧ (t BB t)),
which is denoted by (A,R) |= A(t).
• t is a complete extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (A(t) ∧
∀t2 ((singl(t2) ∧ (t BB t2)) =⇒ (t2 ⊆ t))), which is denoted by
(A,R) |= C(t).
• t is the grounded extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (C(t) ∧
∀t2 (C(t2) =⇒ (t ⊆ t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |= G(t).
• t is a stable extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (F (t) ∧ ∀t2
((singl(t2) ∧ ¬(t2 ⊆ t)) =⇒ (t B t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
S(t).
• t is a preferred extension of (A,R) if and only if (A,R) |= (A(t) ∧
∀t2 (((t2 6= t)∧ (t ⊆ t2)) =⇒ ¬A(t2))), which is denoted by (A,R) |=
P (t).
Proof of Proposition 8. It follows easily from Definition 13 and from the
definitions of the semantics.
Theorem 3. Given T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU a set of authorized transitions, there
exists an operator ♦T satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 if and only if there
is an assignment respecting T such that ∀G ∈ ΓU, ∀ϕ, α ∈ YALLAU,
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(1) [ϕ♦T α] = ∅ if ∃G ∈ [ϕ] such that [ΦU(G)♦T α] = ∅
(2) [ϕ♦T α] =
⋃
G∈[ϕ]
[ΦU(G)♦T α] otherwise
(3) [ΦU(G)♦T α] =
{
G1 ∈ ΓU
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
G1 ∈ [α] and
(G,G1) ∈ T and
(∀G2 ∈ [α] such that (G,G2) ∈ T ,G1 G G2)
}
Proof of Theorem 3. It follows easily from Theorem 2 and from the parallel
between graphs and sets of worlds.
Proposition 9. Given a set of authorized transitions T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU such
that32 Te ⊆ T , for any characterization C of the form:
“If G |= γ1 and ∃z,Rz such that o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 is executable by
an agent on G and o(G) |= αz then o(G) |= γ2”,
it holds that every assignment respecting T and Te allows us to define
a generalized enforcement operator ♦T in the same way as in Theorem 3
satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 and the additional postulate
AC : ∀A ⊆ AU,∀RA ⊆ A×A, ∀z ∈ AU \ A,
∀Rz ⊆ ({z} × A) ∪ (A× {z}),
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉,
if ΦU(G) |= γ1 and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(o(G)) |= αz
then ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= γ2.
where ϕRz =
∧
(x,y)∈Rz)
(x B y)∧
∧
x∈G|(x,z) 6∈Rz
¬(x B z)∧
∧
y∈G|(z,y)6∈Rz
¬(z B
y) is a formula that describes the attacks that are in Rz and that excludes
any other attack concerning z.
Proof of Proposition 9. Due to Theorem 3, every assignment respecting T
allows us to define a generalized enforcement operator ♦T satisfying E3,
U4, E5, E8 and U9.
Let us show that ♦T satisfies AC . For any graph G = (A,RA) and
any argument z 6∈ A and any set of attacks Rz that are concerning z, let
o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉 and let us assume that (a1) ΦU(G) |= γ1, (a2) (G, o(G)) ∈ Te
32The elementary operations that are executable should be authorized, i.e. included in
the set of authorized transitions.
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and (a3) ΦU(o(G)) |= αz. (a1) means that G |= γ1. Moreover, (a2) means
that o is an elementary operation executable by an agent on G. (a3) means
that o(G) |= αz. Hence we can apply the characterization C and we get that
o(G) |= γ2.
In order to prove AC , we are going to show that o(G) is the only model
of ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz).
Using Theorem 3, we have [ΦU(G)♦T (on(z)∧ϕRz)] = {G1 ∈ [on(z)∧ϕRz ]
| (G,G1) ∈ T and (∀G2 ∈ [on(z) ∧ ϕRz ] such that (G,G2) ∈ T ,G1 G G2)}.
Now, an operation from G (that does not contain z) to a graph in
[on(z) ∧ ϕRz ] should at least add the argument z together with exactly
Rz interactions (and no other interaction concerning z), hence the only el-
ementary operation that could do that is o = 〈⊕, z,Rz〉. Moreover, since
Te ⊆ T it means that (G, o(G)) ∈ T (since o is an elementary change exe-
cutable by an agent on G). Now if there exists another operation o′ from G
to a graph in [on(z) ∧ ϕRz ] and such that (G, o′(G)) ∈ T then this opera-
tion is not elementary (i.e. o′(G) contains z with exactly its corresponding
attacks but o′(G) either contains some other arguments that were not in G
or it is the case that some arguments that were in G are no longer in o′(G)).
Hence o(G) ≺G o′(G). This is true for every operation o′ distinct from o
which means that {o(G)} = [ΦU(G) ♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz)]. We have seen that
o(G) |= γ2 hence ΦU(G)♦T (on(z) ∧ ϕRz) |= γ2.
Proposition 10. Given a set of authorized transitions T ⊆ ΓU × ΓU such
that Te ⊆ T , for any characterization C of the form:
“If G |= γ1 and ∃z such that o = 〈	, z,∅〉 is executable by an
agent on G and G |= αz then o(G) |= γ2”,
it holds that every assignment respecting T and Te allows us to define
a generalized enforcement operator ♦T in the same way as in Theorem 3
satisfying E3, U4, E5, E8, U9 and the additional property
AC : ∀A ⊆ AU,∀RA ⊆ A×A, ∀z ∈ A,
let G = (A,RA) and o = 〈	, z,∅〉,
if ΦU(G) |= γ1 and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and ΦU(G) |= αz
then ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z) |= γ2
Proof of Proposition 10. Due to Theorem 3, every assignment respecting T
allows us to define a generalized enforcement operator ♦T satisfying E3,
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U4, E5, E8 and U9. Now since Te ⊆ T it means that all elementary tran-
sitions are authorized. Therefore an assignment respecting T and preferring
elementary changes will associate to any graph G a preference relation G
that will prefer to perform an elementary change if it exists. Thus the pre-
ferred (wrt to G) graphs satisfying the formula ¬on(z) are the graphs that
are obtained by an elementary change done on G if they exist. Moreover
since z ∈ A this elementary change is necessarily the removal of z. There
is only one elementary change o that removes z it is exactly 〈	, z,∅〉. This
means that the only model of [ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z)] is 〈	, z,∅〉(G); then using
the characterization we know that if G |= γ1 and if o is executable by an
agent on G and o(G) |= αz then o(G) |= γ2. Hence if o is executable by an
agent on G it means that [ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z)] = {o(G)}, thus if ΦU(G) |= γ1
and (G, o(G)) ∈ Te and o(G) |= αz then ΦU(G)♦T ¬on(z) |= γ2.
Proposition 11. ♦on satisfies all the characterization properties.
Proof of Proposition 11. Since the assignment of on is preferring elemen-
tary changes then, due to Propositions 9 and 10, we obtain directly the
result.
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